



# Innomissions – Learning-oriented evaluation

February 2026

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# 1 Executive Summary

In 2020 the Danish Climate Act was passed with bold GHG emission reduction targets, and public funds were allocated to four research and innovation missions to contribute to the achievement of the reduction goals. Innovation Fund Denmark (IFD) quickly established the four Innomissions within a fiscal year, with large partnerships formed around broad roadmaps: **INNO-CCUS** on carbon capture, utilisation, and storage; **MissionGreenFuels** on green fuels for transportation and industry; **AgriFoodTure** on green transition of the Danish agri-food system; and **TRACE** on transition towards a circular economy with an emphasis on plastics and textiles.

At the request of Innovation Fund Denmark, Pluss Leadership has conducted an independent learning evaluation of the Innomissions initiative. The report is not a formal evaluation of the individual missions or their impact. Rather, its purpose is to take stock of experiences to date and to extract lessons from Denmark's initial experience with publicly funded mission-oriented research and innovation. The main findings are presented below.

## Developing a mission approach over time

Ambitions were high, but the practical meaning of a mission-oriented approach was not clearly described at the outset. Instead, the launch of the missions was dominated by existing funding logics focusing on distributing project grants, and mission secretariats were built accordingly. Gradually, Innomissions and IFD have developed the mission-oriented approach in practice and adjusted processes and roles. While a common understanding of what a mission approach entails in practice has emerged, some dimensions are still under development.

## How do the missions work mission-oriented?

Today, all four missions have built strong multi-sectoral partnerships with ownership and engagement among key actors. They have set common mission goals in initial roadmaps, but as the roadmaps have proven too broad, the missions are in the process of increasing their strategic focus. Mission secretariats have become effective administrators of funding and are beginning to develop the competencies needed for stronger strategic roles. Together with IFD, they navigate paradoxes of public funded mission-oriented innovation, e.g. between administrative control and strategic, professional freedom. Still, significant room for improvement exists.

## Does the mission-oriented approach add the promised value?

It is still too early to judge if the mission instrument can lead to larger GHG emissions reductions than traditional funding instruments. The partnerships have built ownership, engagement, and trust across universities, companies and other stakeholders – often among actors who previously competed rather than collaborated. This is a key enabler for creating future mission impact. The investments in establishing recognised partnerships and developing the mission approach in practice have been made, while the larger transformative value—if it materialises—lies in the period ahead.

## Could the potential be even better exploited?

The missions particularly need to strengthen three dimensions of the mission approach: 1) Strategic portfolio management ensuring that projects are selected and combined to drive tipping points and systemic change; 2) Productive interactions across the ecosystem, enabling partners to co-create knowledge, challenge assumptions, and jointly shape innovation pathways; and 3) Strategic learning, using evidence and experience to adjust direction, identify emerging needs and reprioritise. Future missions can be guided by the learnings from this evaluation.



# 2 Introduction


When the four Danish Innomissions were initiated in 2021, public funded innovation in Denmark embarked on a new journey. The Innomissions emerged from a strong political commitment to achieving a 70% reduction in CO<sub>2</sub>-equivalent emissions by 2030 and net-zero by 2050. This ambition created both a sense of urgency and space for new approaches. The Innomissions represented a response to the question of how research and innovation could be more purposefully directed towards reducing greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions and transforming the country into a low-carbon society. At the same time, the Innomissions also provided a response to a critique of the Danish Research and Innovation system for lacking a clear direction, being fragmented and for reforms focusing on the individual parts rather than the overall innovation system.<sup>1</sup>

At the request of Innovation Fund Denmark, Pluss Leadership has conducted a learning evaluation of the Innomissions initiative. The purpose of this review is not to carry out a formal evaluation of the individual missions or to assess their impact. Rather, the aim is to take stock of experiences to date, reflect on the implementation and governance of mission-driven innovation in a Danish public-sector context, and extract lessons that can inform existing and future mission-oriented efforts.

First, the four Innomissions are presented in more detail in Section 3. We provide a brief history of their launch, a characteristic of each of the missions and a description of IFD’s current role.

We structure the remainder of the report around four analytical steps illustrated in Figure 1.

Figure 1: Four analytical steps structuring the evaluation



<sup>1</sup> European Commission (2019) "Peer Review of the Danish R&I System".

**What does it mean to work mission-oriented?** And how could we expect that approach to create more value than traditional funding instruments for research and innovation? In Section 4 we suggest a theoretical foundation for assessing how the Innomissions work mission-oriented and their potentials for creating additional value. First, we present the expected impact pathways where the Innomissions could differ from traditional funding instruments. Next, we describe eight dimensions of working mission-oriented, which could enable the missions to achieve this impact.

**How do the Innomissions work mission-oriented?** Using the eight dimensions of working mission-oriented, we proceed to assess the implementation of the mission-oriented approach in Section 5. When unfolding the dimensions, it becomes clear that strengthening one dimension may come at the expense of another dimension. We describe these interdependencies through five paradoxes inherent to publicly funded missions-oriented innovation.

**What is the value-added of working mission-oriented?** As the mission-oriented approach has not yet been fully implemented, the question is difficult to answer. In Section 6, we present indications for potential value added along the impact pathways presented in Section 4. Here, we break down the additional GHG reduction potential through partnership activities and through the project portfolio.


**Could the potential be better exploited?** We conclude with recommendations for strengthening the potential of the Innomissions and general learnings for publicly funded research and innovation missions in Section 7.

To extract lessons for designing missions in a public, regulated context, it is necessary to consider the entire governance chain illustrated in Figure 2. The evaluation has a primary focus on mission management, but the political layer and IFD set important preconditions for how the Innomissions can operate, which we describe in section 3 and return to throughout the analysis.

We hope that the evaluation will be helpful for anyone interested in embarking on the mission-oriented approach to improve the ability of our societal capacity to respond to the challenges ahead of us. At the same time, we hope that the reading will be enjoyable.



Figure 2: Governance chain



## The four green Innomissions and their political mandate

1. **INNO-CCUS: Capture, utilisation, and storage of CO<sub>2</sub>**  
Develop cost-effective solutions for capturing and storing CO<sub>2</sub> to reduce emissions and create negative emissions from major industrial sources, waste incineration plants, biogas facilities, and biomass-based power plants. Combined with hydrogen from renewable energy, captured CO<sub>2</sub> can provide carbon for net-zero solutions.
2. **MissionGreenFuels: Green fuels for transport and industry (Power-to-X, etc.)**  
Develop technologies to convert renewable electricity into fuels and products that can reduce emissions from transport and industrial sectors lacking cost-effective fossil-free alternatives.
3. **AgriFoodTure: Climate- and environment friendly agriculture & food production**  
Develop technologies and solutions that significantly reduce the climate and environmental impact of both conventional and organic farming and food production - e.g. by lowering emissions from livestock, fertilisers, and soils, and by promoting carbon sequestration, biorefining, sustainable feed and food products, plant breeding, and better regulatory knowledge and documentation of emissions.
4. **TRACE: Circular economy with focus on plastics and textiles**  
Promote a circular economy by developing solutions that improve resource efficiency, reduce waste, and increase both the quantity and quality of recycling with a focus on textiles and plastics, e.g. through new design and production methods, sustainable consumption models, better material traceability, and high-quality recycling.

Source: Agreement on the Research Reserve 2021

## 3 The four Danish Innomissions

This section first outlines the political and institutional origins of Denmark's green Innomissions and the journey from political wish to established partnerships. Next, it characterises the four missions according to their different purpose, focus, ecosystem and organisational structure and compare the four. Finally, it describes the role of IFD to understand the working conditions under which the Innomissions operate.

### 3.1 The political origin of the Innomissions

In January 2019, a small group of Danish citizens submitted a public proposal calling for a Danish Climate Act. The proposal quickly gathered the 50,000 signatures required for it to be considered by the Danish Parliament. The sitting government rejected the proposal, but the entire opposition gathered to support it. The upcoming Danish election – nicknamed the Climate Election – changed the majority in Parliament and the adoption of a Climate Act was included in the agreement between the new coalition partners. The Danish Climate Act was passed in 2020 with binding national targets: a 70% reduction in greenhouse-gas emissions by 2030 (compared to 1990) and climate neutrality by 2050. The next question, then, was: how?

Denmark's four green *Innomissions* became one of the initiatives to meet climate targets. In September 2020, the government launched a national strategy for green research, technology and innovation, *Fremtidens grønne løsninger*. The strategy includes four research and innovation missions to accelerate breakthroughs towards the 2030 and 2050 targets in the Climate Act and creates a green business success story in Denmark. The missions should be implemented through broad partnerships with both public and private actors spanning entire value chains.

The political mandate was then operationalised in the fiscal budget through *Agreement on the Research Reserve 2021* (October 2020), which earmarked DKK 700 million to establish "Green Research and Innovation Partnerships" administered by IFD. The funds came from the European Recovery and Resilience Facility. The agreement confirmed the four missions and gave IFD the task to structure and channel the investments. However, IFD had limited resources and time to develop this new funding instrument – the money had to be disbursed within the fiscal year. Figure 3Figure 1 shows the timelines for both the political decisions, IFD and the mission partnerships.

### 3.2 Fast bottom-up approach using existing funding instrument

IFD translated the political intent into a fast, two-step call sequence:

1. Call for Roadmaps (no funding): First, IFD invited multi-actor consortia to co-produce mission roadmaps providing a comprehensive overview of the steps to be taken to achieve the goals outlined by the government defining inflection points and priority pathways. The roadmaps should cover the entire value chain and collect all driving forces from researchers, investors, existing and new industries, technology providers, education and talents, legislators and authorities, to users and customers. There was no prespecified format. These roadmaps served as the backbone for forming partnerships.



2. Call for Partnerships (with funding): Six out of twelve submitted roadmaps were chosen by the IFD Board, and IFD called for proposals to form one (or more) partnerships per mission to implement the roadmaps, with a request to merge the two roadmaps for mission 1 and 2 respectively. Applications had to quantify the value creation, prioritise activities from the roadmap, present a partnership covering the entire value chain, a governance model and detail Pool 1 projects, while Pool 2 projects could be selected at a later stage.


With an open invitation to all relevant stakeholders to propose roadmaps in broad consortia, IFD took a bottom-up approach by letting stakeholders describe the desired future within the four mission areas and set the proposed pathways towards these futures. The process resulted in very broad partnerships for all four missions, spanning collaborations across all relevant Danish knowledge institutions, across disciplines, and including both small and large industry partners. The resulting roadmaps were comprehensive maps of all relevant national activities within the mission areas. Time did not allow the broad range of stakeholders to strive for a strategic selection of initiatives and inflection points as requested in the call text; hence, activities described in the roadmaps by far exceeded the actions that could be taken with IFD funding.

With limited time and resources for the development of a funding instrument, IFD built on the existing guidelines from their partnership program, Grand Solutions, and anchored the Innomissions organisationally within the team responsible for the Grand Solutions programme. This program funds research and innovation partnerships between companies, research institutions, and/or public organisations that aim to achieve clear societal or economic potentials that can be implemented in practice – much like the intention of the Innomissions. Hence, it was an obvious choice to extend this model to encompass the Innomissions and to require them to use the Grand Solution template for the projects in their portfolio. The template includes co-funding requirements: To ensure that companies have a stake in the process and are invested in the long-term implementation of the solutions, the grant only covers up to 75% of total project costs. Another advantage of using the existing Grand Solution instrument as template was to ensure compliance with regulatory and legal frameworks such as EU state aid rules. In this way, IFD could play it safe when there was limited time to develop the new approach.

There has been a mutual understanding between IFD and the mission partnerships of the need for ongoing adjustments to the administrative set-up for the missions due to the rapid start. Acknowledging that the mission approach was new in Denmark, IFD set up a Mission International Advisory Board consisting of international actors with mission experience, e.g. from ARPA-E and Climate-KIC. This allowed IFD and the Innomissions to be guided by international experience.



Figure 3: Timeline for political decisions, IFD and the mission partnerships



Note: In 2022, the funds allocated to the mission areas, approximately MDKK 300, were distributed through IFD's other programmes, such as Grand Solutions, rather than through the four mission partnerships

### 3.3 Small secretariats in charge of developing the mission approach

By mid-2022, IFD and the mission partnerships had signed investment agreements, and the partnerships could hire mission directors, and establish mission boards and secretariats. The mission boards include representatives of partners from knowledge institutions as well as small and large companies, with stipulated rotation schemes to ensure the distribution of power across the universities and large companies. Three of the four mission secretariats are administratively coordinated or hosted within universities, which enables them to leverage the universities' existing institutional set-up. AgriFoodTure was hosted by an independent research and innovation company; we will return to the implications below.

In the beginning, secretariats were intentionally small, including a mission director and 1-2 dedicated employees in addition to resources and support from the hosting institutions. This approach was based on the general understanding that the impact of the missions would materialise through the project portfolio. Most actors in and around the missions were concerned about wasting resources due to the double layer of administration that the mission secretariats represented. Nevertheless, the newly formed secretariats had to navigate the EU State Aid rules, the Danish Public Administration Act, and ensure compliance with EU level documentation requirements related to the Recovery and Resilience Funds. The first pool of projects was already selected as part of the partnership application, while the secretariats were responsible for handling the disbursement of Pool 2 funds. IFD provided administrative support in this phase. As the Fiscal budget for 2023 included an additional DKK300 million for the Innomissions, IFD earmarked DKK40 million to build secretariat capacity in acknowledgement of their administrative task and mission work.

The IFD call for roadmaps outlined the idea of a mission-oriented approach by requiring that individual innovation efforts be placed into a broader strategic plan based on coordination and commitment across the entire value chain. The follow-up partnership call further supported a systemic view by highlighting the importance of regulatory frameworks, public demand as a driving force, and citizens' and end-user engagement in the transition. The task of operationalising these bold ideas and defining what it means to work in a mission-oriented way was then primarily the task of the mission secretariats and the mission boards during the first couple of years.

What is the strategic role of the secretariats and boards beyond allocating funds to projects? What is required for research and innovation ideas to be fully implemented? Exactly *how* research and innovation missions contribute to accelerating green solutions and reducing GHG emissions in a better way than stand-alone projects was not clearly described, either in the governmental strategy or by IFD, and the process led to investment agreements promising more than what could be achieved with the funding. One informant describes the lack of expectation alignment in this way:

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*"We have played the whispering game in the dialogue between politicians, Innovation Fund Denmark, down to the execution of missions and back."*  
[about how mission-oriented innovation leads to GHG emission reductions]

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IFD acknowledged that the roadmaps did not function as a strategic steering tool for the missions, as they were too comprehensive to be executed with IFD funding. Building on recommendations from the Mission International Advisory Board, IFD developed an Impact Framework for Mission-oriented Innovation in 2024, which served to focus the strategic direction of the missions and provide a tool for monitoring mission progress. The framework emphasised the role of inflection points (or tipping points) and provided a common language for how to take a mission approach. In 2025, the missions are creating mission-specific impact frameworks to adjust the frame to their context and to make it a tool for steering and learning. A shared understanding of a mission-oriented approach is slowly emerging; though it should have been clear from the outset, many central actors express that they only recently understood how the mission approach differs from usual research and innovation funding.


In the next four sections, we provide a brief overview of the four Innomissions; their purpose and focus; their strategic direction as stated in their North Star and the Tipping points they steer towards; the ecosystem and technical landscape within which they operate; their partnership model and position in the ecosystem; and their organisational structure.



### 3.4 INNO-CCUS: Carbon capture, utilisation, and storage



### 3.5 MissionGreenFuels: Sustainable Fuels

 <p><b>Purpose &amp; Focus</b></p>	 <p><b>North Star</b></p>	 <p><b>Tipping points</b></p>
<p>Accelerates the development and deployment of green fuels for transport and industry, with a focus on shipping and aviation where electrification is not sufficient. The mission addresses both climate goals, energy security, and independence. A priority that has become urgent amid rising geopolitical uncertainty and the need for greater supply independence.</p>	<p>Integration of sustainable fuels in transport and industry before 2050.</p>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Achieving cost parity of green fuels with fossil fuels in 2030</li> <li>2. Technology clarification and demonstration to reduce uncertainty and increase investment readiness by 2030</li> <li>3. Development of an efficient market for sustainable fuels by 2050.</li> </ol>
 <p><b>Ecosystem &amp; technical landscape</b></p>	 <p><b>Partnership model &amp; position in the ecosystem</b></p>	 <p><b>Organisational structure</b></p>
<p>Operates in an emerging, pre-market environment with fragmented value chains and limited data sharing. Builds on strong Danish Power-to-X expertise, but scaling requires cost reduction, regulation, and trust.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Structured as a cross-sector partnership connecting research, industry, and SMEs across the green fuels value chain</li> <li>• Working towards becoming a system orchestrator and portfolio coordinator, linking partners and projects to strengthen alignment and learning</li> <li>• Partners share commitment but are often uncertain about how their contributions fit into the broader mission.</li> </ul>	<p>Hosted by Aalborg University. The secretariat includes:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Partnership Director</li> <li>• Admin Coordinator</li> <li>• Impact Manager</li> <li>• Communication Consultant</li> <li>• Project support from employees at Energy Cluster Denmark and Danish Center for Energy Storage.</li> </ul>

### 3.6 AgriFoodTure: Climate- and environmentally friendly agriculture and food production

 <p><b>Purpose &amp; Focus</b></p>	 <p><b>North Star</b></p>	 <p><b>Tipping points</b></p>
<p>Drives the transition towards climate- and environmentally friendly agriculture and food production. Focuses on reducing emissions across crops, soils, and livestock, advancing methane-reducing technologies, circular biorefineries, and alternative proteins.</p>	<p>Net-zero GHG emissions in the Danish agricultural and food sector by 2050.</p>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Implementation of effective methane-reducing technologies and practices on a large scale</li> <li>2. Widespread consumer acceptance and integration of plant-rich diets</li> <li>3. Development and adoption of climate-resilient, high-yield, and nutrient-rich crop varieties, especially those reducing the need for fertilizers and pesticides</li> <li>4. Scaling of technologies at the industrial level, particularly in the integration of circular economy models, biogenic carbon, and alternative proteins.</li> </ol>
 <p><b>Ecosystem &amp; technical landscape</b></p>	 <p><b>Partnership model &amp; position in the ecosystem</b></p>	 <p><b>Organisational structure</b></p>
<p>Operates within a deeply rooted agri-food system embedded in larger economic and social structures. Many actors are invested in existing production models, making transformation complex. Builds on Denmark's strong agricultural technology and biorefining expertise, but progress depends on systemic change, market incentives, and societal consensus.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Brings diverse and often conflicting interests together, creating a platform for dialogue and collaboration</li> <li>• Partners engage despite deep disagreements; SME participation is limited</li> <li>• Merged with Food &amp; Bio Cluster Denmark in 2025 and aiming to build a clearer identity and shared narrative, while working to strengthen systems for learning and coordination across projects.</li> </ul>	<p>Initially hosted by SEGES Innovation, leading to a 25% co-finance requirement, and thus established an association with paid membership. Merger with Food&amp;Bio Cluster who is new host. The secretariat includes:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Partnership Director</li> <li>• Programme Manager</li> <li>• Partnership and Outreach Manager</li> <li>• Supported by four work-stream leads</li> <li>• Administrative support: SEGES, Aarhus University and Food&amp;Bio Cluster.</li> </ul>

### 3.7 TRACE: Circular economy with a focus on plastics and textiles

 <p><b>Purpose &amp; Focus</b></p>	 <p><b>North Star</b></p>	 <p><b>Tipping points</b></p>
<p>Accelerates the transition towards a circular economy in plastics and textiles by improving product design, sorting, recycling, and traceability across value chains. Works to demonstrate viable circular systems and build the data and governance frameworks needed for large-scale transformation in a field lacking clear political direction.</p>	<p>A Regenerative Circular Society by 2050.</p>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Compliance – A Shared Baseline for Circular Transition</li> <li>2. Transparent – Circular Business Models Become a Viable Choice</li> <li>3. Integrated – Circular Becomes the System Default</li> </ol>
 <p><b>Ecosystem &amp; technical landscape</b></p>	 <p><b>Partnership model &amp; position in the ecosystem</b></p>	 <p><b>Organisational structure</b></p>
<p>Operates in an immature and fragmented market with limited incentives and coordination. Success depends on new business models, technological innovation, and industry buy-in. Builds on Danish strengths in material science, circular design, and systems analysis, but requires stronger market signals and leadership engagement.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Defined role as a harmoniser, builder, and pathfinder, using experiments to make future circular models tangible and investable</li> <li>• Builds a shared language and learning platform through <i>Circular Readiness Level</i> and <i>TRACE Academy</i></li> <li>• Strong engagement from practitioners, but limited leadership commitment, particularly in the textiles sector.</li> </ul>	<p>Independent association. University of Southern Denmark provides hosting arrangements for selected administrative functions. The secretariat includes:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Partnership Director</li> <li>• Programme Manager</li> <li>• Project Manager</li> <li>• Funding and Strategic Manager</li> <li>• Communication agency - Supported by three work-stream leads</li> <li>• CLEAN (association finance).</li> </ul>

### 3.8 Comparing the four Innomissions

Looking across the four Innomissions, it becomes evident that they operate under highly different political, sectoral, and market conditions, reflecting the diversity of the green transition. While they share a common overall governance and a common mission-oriented framework, their political mandates, levels of maturity, and system complexity vary substantially.

The four missions thus began from very different starting points. INNO-CCUS and MissionGreen-Fuels entered with strong political direction and relatively open, pre-competitive ecosystems, where actors were motivated by shared learning and emerging market opportunities. By contrast, AgriFoodTure operates within a deeply entrenched agri-food system shaped by existing production models and conflicting interests, making transformation complex and politically sensitive. TRACE, meanwhile, addresses a fragmented and immature circular-economy landscape with weak incentives and limited regulatory direction, relying instead on experimentation and network building. These structural contrasts have influenced not only the pace of progress, but also each mission's ability to align partners and work in a mission-oriented way from the outset.

Despite these differences, all four missions are now guided by a mission-specific impact framework that provides structure for setting direction, learning and tracking progress. Each mission has defined its North Star and three to five tipping points that describe the key systemic shifts required to reach their goals. The tipping points differ in character, ranging from specific technological or market outcomes (e.g., cost parity, storage capacity, or methane reduction) to broader systemic transformations (e.g., consumer behaviour, circular market integration, or public legitimacy).

While a systems view has been present in varying degrees in initial roadmaps, the missions' North Stars and tipping points have strengthened the narrative that they are not merely technological programmes, but also vehicles for broader systemic transformation. They reflect an understanding that achieving Denmark's climate goals requires progress across governance, markets, social acceptance, and behavioural change, not just technical breakthroughs. In this sense, the missions take responsibility beyond their immediate research and innovation agendas, seeking to build the institutional, societal, and market conditions needed for a long-term transition.

### 3.9 The role of Innovation Fund Denmark

In this evaluation, we have been asked to characterise the Innomissions and assess if the mission partnerships are working in a mission-oriented way. However, to understand the Innomissions, it is important to describe the framework and working conditions under which they operate. Therefore, we describe the role of IFD here. We have already described how IFD navigated the start-up process of the missions, so in this section we turn to the current administration of the Innomissions. The role of IFD falls in four parts:

- Distribution of funds from fiscal budgets
- Oversight of progress and compliance
- Supporting the Innomissions to achieve impact
- Reporting to the Ministry of Higher Education and Science.

IFD's administration of the Innomissions is organised in a mission team with one manager and four investment officers, each assigned as the lead for one mission and co-lead for another, to ensure close tracking and support. The mission team was established in September 2023 to strengthen administration and development of this complex funding instrument.

On the fiscal budgets for 2023, 2024, and 2025, around DKK 300 million has been earmarked in the Agreement of the Research Reserve for IFD to distribute in competition between the four Innomissions. In 2023, IFD channelled the funds through three calls, but IFD has chosen to channel the funds for the latest two years through an annual call. This was done both to reduce the administrative burden for mission secretariats of application writing and to speed up the distribution of funds by releasing the call not long after the fiscal budget has been announced. Applications are assessed by external evaluators and the IFD secretariat, while the investment decision is taken by the IFD board. Assessment criteria are quality of effort, impact, and quality of execution, where quality of effort is partly understood as past performance. This implies that applications also include reporting on performance. While the guidelines for the first partnership grant in 2021 required the missions to use the Grand Solutions project template, guidelines in later calls opened for the use of other funding instruments. Three of the missions have also employed an instrument to boost small and medium sized enterprises, but until now none of them have developed their own funding instruments, as this would draw too many resources.

In 2023, IFD and the Innomissions recognized a need for a new governance model delegating a stronger mandate to the mission partnerships. Under the previous model, most formal decisions were retained by the IFD Board, which approved compliance and investment agreements with each project partner, and had to approve all major changes and additions. In the revised model, these responsibilities are largely devolved. The IFD Secretariat now handles compliance checks, while a single investment agreement is signed with the partnership's authorised signatory rather than with each individual partner in the partnership. The partnerships themselves enter agreements with new partners and projects and approve project changes within the overall framework. IFD maintains its follow-up and supervision role, but day-to-day decision-making authority has now been moved closer to the missions. This new governance model was not easy to settle. The negotiations took more than a year to complete, as the legal foundation was unclear. Through dialogue with the Legal Adviser to the Danish Government (Kammeradvokaten), a legal basis for the new governance model was found in the Research Reserve Agreement. As a result, the investment agreements for part of the 2023 funds, and for the 2024 and 2025 funds, were entered as late as spring 2025 with the new governance model giving the missions a stronger mandate.

Compliance with regulatory and legal requirements plays an important role, in particular the Danish Public Administration Act and EU State Aid Rules. The fact that the first pool of funds for the Innomissions came from the EU Recovery and Resilience Facility has led to additional documentation and reporting, also because the Innomissions were selected for EU audit. Box 1 provides an overview of the regulatory and legal frameworks that IFD must navigate when administering the Innomissions.

The oversight of mission progress and compliance has multiple elements: The lead and co-lead investment officers conduct continuous tracking and participate as observers in mission board meetings. The missions produce annual reports that include both a progress and a financial section. The progress section includes both a retrospective part, providing a status on the past year, and a forward-looking part, outlining the strategic direction going forward. Progress and strategic priorities are then discussed at Annual Investment Reviews with the following actors present: The mission director and representative(s) from the chairmanship of the mission board; selected IFD board members; and the Mission International Advisory Board. These meetings serve the dual purpose of holding the missions accountable while providing support and advice on how to strengthen their impact potentials. In addition, IFD processes requests for changes to the grant. In 2025, IFD strengthened its oversight concept by introducing annual oversight meetings. The focus of each meeting is on areas at highest risk of non-compliance with the grant conditions, based on a preceding risk analysis.

IFD supports the missions to achieve impact in multiple ways in addition to ongoing administrative support and guidance. Based on recommendations from the Mission International Advisory board, IFD launched an Impact Framework in 2024 supporting the missions in focusing efforts and installing strategic learning as mentioned above. To become a more active investor, the IFD board also initiated yearly dialogue meetings with the missions in 2024.

Finally, IFD must report on mission progress to the Ministry of Higher Education and Science and the Danish Agency for Higher Education and Science. In autumn 2024, the government launched the initiative: *Speeding up the green solutions of the future*, which calls for semi-annual reporting to the government's Green Committee on progress of green initiatives. The missions are expected to report yearly starting in 2025, with results within agriculture and foods receiving special political attention due to a greenhouse tax on farming in 2030. However, the mission-oriented approach also requires a new approach to reporting, and the challenge is that expectations are not clearly aligned between politicians, ministry, agency and IFD on what the missions can deliver and how mission progress can be documented. The Impact Framework for Mission-oriented Innovation states that:

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*Progress can be demonstrated through the mission's ability to learn, adapt and make better strategic decision which are implemented in practice.*

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This implies that the Innomissions are accountable to learning – and acting on that learning. A classical understanding of progress according to predefined milestones is not useful when the missions need to be able to navigate the changing world with the uncertainty of what may become possible. The Impact Framework should serve as a tool for monitoring mission progress. Exactly how the missions can report on the progress they make through learning and adaptation is under development. IFD will need to align expectations with the ministry and develop a reporting format that is both appropriate for the four Innomissions and politically acceptable.

As this section shows, the mission approach has developed over time and some elements, such as progress reporting, is still under development. The approach will probably continue to evolve when it meets practice and new learnings emerge. Nevertheless, we will proceed to characterise the mission approach and its expected impact pathways.

*Box 1: Regulatory and legal frameworks relevant to the Innomissions*

**1. EU State Aid Rules**

Type: EU regulation

Implications: Funding must comply with EU rules on state aid, ensuring that public investments do not distort market competition. In practice, this means that IFD faces limitations in allocating mission funds to activities considered commercial in nature. Mission partnerships must therefore distinguish clearly between research, innovation, and market implementation, and ensure appropriate co-funding and separation of economic and non-economic activities.

**2. Danish Public Administration Act (Forvaltningsloven)**

Type: National law

Implications: Provides the legal framework for public authorities' administrative conduct. For the Innomissions, this means that both IFD and the mission secretariats must act in accordance with principles of legality, impartiality, transparency, and equal treatment.

**3. Fiscal Budget Agreement – Agreement on the Research Reserve**

Type: National fiscal and political framework

Implications: Defines the allocation of national research and innovation funds. Funds are earmarked for the four Innomissions to be distributed by IFD through competition between the four Innomissions.

**4. EU Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF)**

Type: EU funding instrument

Implications: The first DKK 700 million invested in the Innomissions came from the EU Recovery and Resilience Facility. This funding source requires compliance with EU-level monitoring, reporting, and additionality criteria, ensuring that investments contribute to the green transition and economic recovery objectives of the RRF. It also imposes time-bound spending and documentation requirements on the fund's administration.

# 4 What does it mean to work mission-oriented?

In this section, we seek to operationalise what it means to work mission-oriented in a publicly funded context, and how such an approach can contribute to realising political ambitions. We first present the pathways in which we expect the Innomissions to add value compared to traditional funding instruments. Next, we extract eight dimensions of working mission-oriented, which we believe to be essential for achieving mission impact.

## 4.1 Mission impact pathways

As described in the green research and innovation strategy, the idea of initiating the green research and innovation missions was to move from funding of stand-alone projects to larger, cohesive, and long-term initiatives with a focus on solving substantial societal challenges. The missions should contribute to national climate targets while creating a business success story through partnerships between knowledge institutions, companies, authorities, and innovation actors with a portfolio of projects spanning the value chain from long-term, foundational research and capacity building, extending through development, testing, and demonstration, to the commercialisation of green solutions closer to the market. However, exactly how publicly funded research and innovation missions were expected to lead to greater GHG reductions than traditional funding instruments was not clearly articulated.

Comparing mission-oriented innovation with stand-alone research and innovation projects, we here suggest a breakdown of the potential of mission-oriented innovation into added value through partnership activities and through the project portfolio. Figure 4 illustrates the potential pathways.

Figure 4: General pathways for mission impact



The **partnership** can contribute to the long-run realisation of GHG reduction through other channels than directly through the project portfolio. First, the coordination of many actors around the common mission can create a strategic alignment across research, business, authorities, and civil society. This can happen within the partnership but also in the wider eco-system if the mission roadmap is adopted by other actors. Second, the partnership can create engagement of key actors who are needed to achieve the mission goal. Third, the partnership can function as a learning hub supporting partners in navigating in a changing world, by dynamically targeting efforts where impact potentials are highest. Finally, the partnership has a potential to address systemic and regulatory barriers that no single actor can address.



The partnership can further strengthen the potential of the **project portfolio** beyond stand-alone projects in three ways—drawing on the logic of the general Impact framework for IFD investments:<sup>2</sup> better selection of projects; stronger project implementation in the grant period; and more effective continuation of the innovation process. We would expect to see:

- **Initiating focused projects** with a sharper direction, strategically chosen to contribute to mission goals, and by creating better matches among mission partners for team collaboration with the right partners and resources.
- **Strengthening project implementation** through strong impact alignment towards the mission goal, closing unpromising projects; synergies and learning across projects or mission partners to strengthen the link between research and innovation and a systemic view; improved progress because the mission partnership addresses necessary conditions for project success outside the scope of the individual project; and/or stronger ownership and anchoring because of the collaborative approach.
- **Continuation of innovation implementation** after end of funding by ensuring that the innovation fits in value chain, by linking to relevant implementation partners, by providing additional funding for promising projects, and/or by linking to other funds/capital.

In this evaluation, we do not dive into the value of the four mission project portfolios, as it is beyond the scope of this report. The first projects were initiated in the end of 2022, and only a small share have been completed to date.

To understand how the mission partnerships can work to realise these mission potentials, we focus on the enablers for change that are necessary for the mission-oriented approach to have impact, both directly through the partnership and through the portfolio

## 4.2 What does mission-oriented work look like?

We take [IFD \(2024\) "Impact Framework for Mission-oriented Innovation"](#) as a starting point for operationalising what mission-oriented work looks like. We use the framework to extract eight dimensions of working mission-oriented, as illustrated in Figure 5. First, we provide a brief description of the framework shown in the left-hand side of the figure – for details, we refer to the publication.

The top layer is the *North Star*: An ambitious, common goal that is concrete and time-bound, directing all strategic decisions in the mission. Below are *Instances of impact*, which stress the importance of collecting instances demonstrating that the goal is possible. While this layer is important for maintaining momentum and installing patience, it does not represent a causal link in the model. Acknowledging that the mission is initiated to address a complex societal challenge aiming for a transformative, non-linear change, the third layer presents *Tipping points*, or inflection points, that lead to accelerating self-sustained change towards the mission goal. To achieve these tipping points and build the bridge to the future, missions use bricks and mortar: A *Strategic, progressive project portfolio* that contains the necessary bricks, glued together by cross-cutting mission activities that create the *Enablers for change*.

The framework describes five essential enablers which are important preconditions for realising mission impact. The first enabler is to establish a multi-sectoral collaboration spanning the quadruple helix: research institutions, companies, authorities, and civil society. This is the key

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<sup>2</sup> See [IFD \(2024\) "Innovation Fund Denmark's impact framework: new framework for measuring value creation"](#), Figure 2.

enabler for realising any impact through the partnership and also through a strengthened portfolio, as described above.

The second enabler is authentic engagement from the partners to achieve the mission goal – the partnership should not only be a shell for distributing research and innovation funds to themselves. Otherwise, partnership impact is limited, and the portfolio could be more efficiently handled by IFD.


The third enabler is strategic learning: The partnership leverages the joint updated knowledge of where impact potentials are highest and draws learnings from their portfolio and mission activities to adjust the strategic direction towards impact. This should lead to the initiation of more focused projects and make mission partnerships address important systemic and regulatory barriers. Furthermore, partners and projects continuously learn from each other and unleash synergies, which strengthen project implementation.

The two final enablers are fundamental for the operation. The fourth enabler is transparent and inclusive governance, which is needed for the partnership to foster the multi-sectoral collaboration and authentic engagement and to build and maintain legitimacy in the ecosystem. The fifth enabler is capacity development for working mission-oriented to develop the necessary competences and allocate the required resources.

In this way, the impact framework for mission-oriented innovation outlines the mission approach that can support the long-term realisation of GHG reductions, both through direct partnership impact and through a focused and strengthened project portfolio.



Figure 5: Impact framework and eight dimensions of working mission-oriented



To assess whether the mission partnerships work mission-oriented, we proceed to identify eight dimensions to examine with a particular focus on the Enablers for change. For each dimension, we list the main evaluation questions.<sup>3</sup> The eight dimensions are:

<sup>3</sup> Evaluation questions for the *Right partners in the partnership* and *Ownership and willingness to invest* have been inspired by [OECD \(2024\) "Monitoring and evaluation of mission-oriented innovation policies"](#). The importance of *Productive interactions* is stressed in [Budtz \(2024\) "Mission Guidebook: A Research Management Guide to Mission-Driven Universities"](#).

- **Common mission goal:** Does the mission partnership have a clearly defined long-term mission goal and shorter term subgoals? Do the partners know the goals? Are all decisions in the mission guided by the goals?
- **Strategic portfolio management:** Are projects initiated within the strategic direction of the mission? Is the portfolio coherent and continuously adjusted based on learning?
- **Right partners in partnership:** Does the partnership include all the actors necessary to reach the mission goals? Are relevant partners matched in projects?
- **Productive interactions:** Do the partners enter productive interactions? Do they co-create, learn from each other, and create transformative value?
- **Ownership and willingness to invest:** Are the partners strategically aligned with the common mission goal? Do they feel ownership, and are they investing time and resources in the mission?
- **Applied learning:** Do the partners, secretariat, and board collect and share learning from activities, projects, and the ecosystem to adjust goals, methods and activities?
- **Trust in decision making:** Do relevant actors have trust in the mission's decision-making processes, and do they experience being included to an appropriate extent?
- **Necessary resources and competencies:** Do the mission secretariats have the necessary resources, structures, and competencies to work mission-oriented?

Figure 5 illustrates how the eight dimensions relate to the elements of the impact framework. While these dimensions have been elements in the dialogues between IFD and the Innomission partnerships, they have not, until now, been conceptualised, nor has there been an alignment between IFD and the mission partnerships on what a successful mission-oriented approach looks like. To take the temperature in the mission partnerships on these eight dimensions, we have unfolded them into rubrics providing a detailed description of five different levels, ranging from 1: the least mission-oriented approach, to 5: the most mission-oriented approach. These rubrics can be found in Appendix, Section 8. The missions do not necessarily need to score 5 on all dimensions to be impactful and will, in some cases, need to prioritise one dimension at the cost of another dimension. We return to these paradoxes in Section 5.4.

We have now established eight dimensions along which we can assess how the Innomissions work mission-oriented in the next section. Furthermore, we have drawn up the expected impact pathways along which we can look for potentials for value added in Section 6.

## 5 How do the missions work mission-oriented?

In this section, we assess how the Innomissions work mission-oriented along the eight dimensions presented in Section 4. We first present the data used to assess the eight dimensions and the following methodological limitations. Then we provide an overview of the survey responses from the partners in the four mission partnerships, before we unfold each dimension in more detail. To further assess the mission-oriented approach of the missions, we turn to their newly developed missions-specific impact frameworks. As some dimensions are interdependent, we proceed to describe five paradoxes that the Innomissions and IFD need to navigate when taking a mission-oriented approach with public funding. Finally, we conclude on how the four Innomissions have implemented the mission-oriented approach.

### 5.1 Data and methodological limitations

We have assessed the eight dimensions of working mission-oriented through the following data sources:

- A survey to partners in the four mission partnerships with full responses from 152 partners, giving an overall response rate of 20%
- Workshops with the mission secretariats focusing on the enablers for change
- Interviews with four people from each mission: the mission director, a board member, a workstream lead, and a central partner
- A workshop with the IFD mission team
- Relevant documents such as roadmaps and annual reports.

A full description of our methods and data sources can be found in Section 8.

When interpreting the findings, it is important to recognise certain methodological limitations. The analysis draws primarily on data generated within the four mission partnerships and IFD. External data sources have not been included, and the evaluation has not involved systematic data triangulation, which would have required a broader scope and additional resources. Consequently, the report's findings and conclusions are based on the perceptions and experiences of actors directly engaged in the missions and should be interpreted in this light. Across the rather different missions, many of the same themes and narratives emerge, which suggests a degree of shared experience but also reflects that the empirical basis is rooted in internal perspectives.

The partnership survey had a relatively low response rate. This may partly reflect limited engagement among some partners, but it is also linked to practical conditions of distribution. The questionnaire was disseminated through the mission secretariats to all contact persons among mission partners, and not all missions were able to distinguish between scientific and administrative contact persons. As a result, the survey was sent widely – in one of the missions in particular – likely reducing the response rate. The timing of the survey coincided with a data collection for an EU audit, which may have contributed to survey fatigue. With these caveats in mind, we find it plausible that the responses primarily represent the most dedicated and engaged partners rather than a representative sample of the partnerships. This would lead to a positive bias in the responses, which we suspect to be the case. Unhappy mission partners could also have used the survey to air their frustrations, but this does not appear to be the case.

The survey was constructed using rubrics, that is, predefined assessment scales where each point on the scale is accompanied by a clear description of what that score represents. The advantage of using rubrics is that they make it harder for respondents to give strategically positive answers without misrepresenting their situation. Because the scale includes detailed explanations of what each level implies, respondents are encouraged to select the value that most accurately reflects their circumstances. The full rubrics can be found in Section 8.2.2.

### 5.2 Eight dimensions of working mission-oriented

We first provide a graphical overview of the survey responses from the four missions, spanning the eight dimensions of working mission-oriented in Figure 6.

Figure 6: The eight dimensions of working mission-oriented for the four Innomissions



A first glance at the responses from the partners of the four missions shows a striking similarity across the missions. This pattern is somewhat surprising, as the missions operate in different ecosystems, take on different roles, and appear to have different degrees of maturity. Nevertheless, they face the same governance structures, have been through similar processes of developing roadmaps, forming partnerships, and shared development of the mission approach, which helps to explain the similarity across missions. One concern could be that this is a consequence of the way the survey instrument was constructed, but we do not see large bunching on specific values or other types of respondent behaviour to support this concern. In addition, we hear very similar narratives from informants from the different missions, supporting the notion that they have taken a similar approach to working in mission-oriented way.

The mission partners report that they have a good overview of the **common mission goal** and that they are applied both for important decisions in the mission partnership and in projects, although less consistently.

Most partners consider projects in the **project portfolio** to have a strategic fit to the mission goals, while the coherence between projects is more disputed. Generally, project partners experience that their grants are administered in a way that allows for strategic adjustments.

The partners agree that their mission includes the **right partners**, with strong coverage of actors relevant for achieving the mission goals. Establishing a multi-sectoral partnership is the first important milestone of the Innomissions: gathering and engaging the important actors along their value chains from knowledge institutions and companies. To span the full quadruple helix, actors from authorities and civil society are also important to include, to pave the way for societal implementation. We consider the mission partnerships to be less strong in these dimensions. This drawback is not reflected in the survey responses, which are dominated by researchers and company representatives, and we see this as a sign of affirmation bias in the self-evaluation.

The next step for the multi-sectoral collaboration is to foster **productive interactions** among the partners, and here collaborations and value creation are still somewhat limited, mostly taking place within project partnerships.

For a mission partnership to succeed, authentic engagement from the actors is needed. We see strong **ownership and willingness to invest** among the respondents, who report strategic alignment between their organisations and the mission, as well as active participation in mission activities beyond project engagement.

The partners report that they **apply learning**, in particular within projects where they reflect and adjust with project partners, though not yet in a fully systematic manner. Sharing learning with the mission partnership is partly done on request and partly on their own initiative. Learning from other mission partners also takes place occasionally.


As for **transparency and inclusion in decision-making**, the partners generally understand how the funding is distributed and mostly find the decisions fair. They report being informed about changes in strategic direction but are not meaningfully involved in shaping the strategic priorities of the mission.

There is a general agreement that the secretariats function well in administering funds, though there are differing opinions about the available **resources and competencies** to play a strategic role.

It is worth mentioning that the results are potentially skewed as only one in five contact persons from mission partners have responded to the survey, and we would expect the more engaged partners to also be more willing to respond. We take this caveat into consideration, as we unfold the dimensions. Overall, the results paint a picture of four missions that have managed to establish strong partnerships and have taken the first important steps to establish the enablers for change towards their mission goals.

While there is a strong similarity between the four missions, we see more pronounced differences in responses across types of partners, in particular for the degree of productive interactions; the ownership and willingness to invest and the necessary resources; for applied learning; and for the experience of the resources and competencies in the mission secretariats, see Figure 7. On these dimensions, partners from knowledge institutions rate the missions significantly higher than companies and other partners, such as public entities, non-profit organisations, and interest organisations. As mission innovation projects can be considered high-risk activities, particularly when the technological readiness levels (TRL) are low, companies can have difficulty allocating the needed time and resources to enter productive interactions, because the innovation is very far from commercialisation. This is especially true for small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) who have shorter investment horizons.

Figure 7: The eight dimensions of working mission-oriented across partner types



In the following, we unfold each dimension and provide a status for the mission partnerships.



### 5.2.1 Common mission goal

The mission goals originally stem from the political mandate and were then translated into goals and pathways towards these goals in the roadmaps. However, initial roadmaps were broad and resembled more a catalogue of all possible things to do within the field, rather than a clear description of how to get from the present to the desired future goal. The initial roadmaps lacked a clear format, they were too broad to be operational, and they were written in a hurry. Many researchers were eager to contribute, both out of strong interest in the field, but also to ensure that their area of expertise was included among the list of what the mission funds could support. The missions have updated roadmaps in recent years, but they remain broad.

There is a shared understanding between IFD and the Innomissions that the goals in the roadmaps are far from achievable with the IFD mission funding. As one informant puts it:

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*“Then a sort of collective myth emerged about what was possible to achieve through research when we wrote the original roadmap”*

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IFD launched the Impact Framework to encourage missions to focus their efforts and specify tipping points that the mission partnerships could influence with the IFD funding. The missions have taken up this task in 2025 and report that the direction has become clearer, e.g.:

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*“It’s fantastic that we have started to set a direction”*

*“We have tightened the guy ropes to sharpen the focus in our workstreams”*

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MissionGreenFuels and TRACE have fully developed the first version of their impact frameworks and launched them on their websites, while AgriFoodTure and INNO-CCUS are still in the process of finalising their impact frameworks.


Meanwhile, AgriFoodTure is implementing the merger with the Danish Food&Bio Cluster, which also requires additional strategic work to clarify the direction of the merged organisation and communicate its role in the ecosystem.

As an additional way of creating a common overview of the mission field, INNO-CCUS has published the State of CCUS, which maps Danish research and innovation projects within the field. This overview helps to position INNO-CCUS in the landscape.



We wanted to know whether the partners are aware of the goals, find them clear, and experience them as guiding decisions in the mission partnership and in their own projects. Almost all respondents have a general idea of the mission goals, and the majority understand the direction well. The numbers are shown in Figure 8 under Knowledge and clarity, where percentages are listed in the pie chart and the number of observations is shown in parentheses. Turning to the application of the goals in guiding decisions, no respondent finds that mission decisions are not guided by mission goals, but one out of five do not find that the mission goals affect their work or guide decisions in the project. Some respondents remarked that since their own project goal falls within the mission goal, they do not need to consider mission goals when making decisions. Among the respondents, we generally conclude that mission goals are well known and projects are aligned with the expected mission impact. The picture may be less positive among the mission partners who did not prioritise responding to the survey, but this is difficult to assess.

Figure 8: Common mission goal



### 5.2.2 Strategic portfolio management

The portfolio of projects should be strategic in the sense that projects contribute to the mission goal and are strategically coherent. However, the first batch of projects that entered the partnership application was collected under a considerable time pressure. From multiple respondents we have heard variations of the following quote:

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*“There was no time – Pool 1 project were taken from the drawer”*

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
The projects fall under the mission theme and contribute in different ways to the mission goal, but they do not constitute a coherent portfolio. Three out of four respondents consider all projects in the portfolio to be strategically relevant, while the remainder find the connection to mission goal unclear for some projects; see Figure 9.

Though a strategic fit with the roadmap has been a selection criterion for newer projects in later pools, it has not been sufficient to foster a strategically coherent project portfolio. In practice, mission boards have tended to prioritise projects with the highest perceived innovation potential, similar to the assessment of Grand Solution applications, as truly strategic selection remains difficult. The governance setup creates an inherent dilemma: board members often represent partner organisations that also apply for project funding. While they withdraw from discussions on their own proposals to avoid conflicts of interest, this practice limits the number of board members able to contribute to discussions about the overall strategic coherence of the portfolio. Ironically, those who must step out are often the ones with the most relevant professional insight.

In terms of portfolio coherence, a third of the project partners have no insight into how the projects in the portfolio fit together and have not been connected by the secretariat or by chance to other similar projects in the mission. They experience a thematic or no connection to other projects in the portfolio as shown in Figure 9. We expect that this number is higher when considering non-respondents. This result suggests that there is still room for creating stronger synergies within the project portfolios.

In order to have a progressive portfolio, strategic adjustments of ongoing projects should be possible, and more than half of the responding project partners find that the grants are administered in a way that allows for strategic adjustments. However, around one in ten experience that it is not possible to adjust the project according to learnings. Furthermore, the mission boards should be able to close unpromising projects and extend projects with strong results. Mission secretariats and boards express that they have faced challenges in this regard: A particular concern for closing projects early has been the consequence for involved PhD students. And topping up successful projects should also be done in a way that do not conflict with the notion of open competition from the Public Administration Act. IFD has worked to address these issues in two ways: They have adjusted guidelines to allow for PhD study completion in the event of project closure, and they have been in dialogue with one mission on other legal models for top-up calls. Only few mission projects have been finalised, but the question of how to ensure continuation of the innovations with impact potential is highly topical, and mission secretariats are developing their approaches to make their portfolios more progressive.

Figure 9: Strategic portfolio management



### 5.2.3 Right partners in the partnership


There is broad consensus among the respondents that the four missions have a broad range of partners in place in the mission partnership or even a strong or systemic coverage of partners, see Figure 10, Mission needs. All missions have established broad partnerships with a strong representation of knowledge institutions and both large and small companies. Public and civil society actors – and to some extent SMEs – are less present, and in the survey data we see indications that actors from authorities and civil society rate the partnership coverage lower. As the number of respondents in this category is small, we cannot tell if the difference is statistically significant, but nevertheless it is worth noting. Some informants argue that the co-finance requirements are difficult for municipalities and civil society actors to fulfil. The former facing strong budgetary constraints and the latter dominated by voluntary efforts. The inclusion of public authorities may take forms other than direct partnership: ministries and public agencies can contribute to overall coordination – a question to which we return.

The key actors not yet included differ across missions: AgriFoodTure experiences difficulty in attracting SMEs and start-ups, whereas MissionGreenFuels lacks municipalities who are important for implementation. INNO-CCUS lacks civil-society partners and representatives from the waste sector. TRACE finds it difficult to engage the Danish textile industry as it is currently not very profitable.

The missions are born as research and innovation missions under the Ministry of Higher Education and Science, and coordination with relevant resort ministries has been up to IFD and the mission partnerships to orchestrate. INNO-CCUS has achieved a particularly strong connection to the public authorities and is representing the Danish state in IEAGHG. AgriFoodTure receives ministerial attention due to its role in delivering solutions to farmers prior to the introduction of a GHG tax on Danish farmers in 2030, but otherwise coordination with relevant sector ministries has been limited for the other Innomissions.

Turning to the match of partners within projects, respondents overall report that projects have good partner composition, see Figure 10, Project needs. Comparing projects initiated in 2022 and 2033 with later projects (not shown in figure), there are indications that later projects experience a better partner match – both within projects and in the mission partnership. This is in line with the idea that initial Pool 1 projects were decided in a hurry, and that mission activities bringing partners together have helped to match the right partners in project teams.

Figure 10: Right partners in the partnership



5.2.4 Productive interactions

The missions have used the Grand Solution project template to initiate collaboration projects with partners from research and industry. Among survey respondents engaged in projects, the vast majority interact and collaborate closely with project partners, as shown in Figure 11. However, only half of the respondents interact with other partners in the mission beyond project collaboration (integrated collaboration or broad mission co-creation). As we expect the most engaged to have responded to the survey, there appears to be room for creating more synergies across projects.

The general impression is that the collaborations bring value: Only one in ten reports limited or no value from the interactions, whereas more than half of the respondents feel that the collaborations have brought either significant or transformative value.

A particular trait of the interactions in the missions is that actors who previously disagreed or were in conflict have started to collaborate – across scientific disciplines, across rivaling universities, across researchers and businesses, across business competitors, and across rivaling political interests in general. Multiple informants mention the very tough process of writing roadmaps and forming partnerships, which took place under COVID, where the partners only interacted over Zoom and Teams under high time pressure. As this informant describes:

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*“A tremendous amount of trust has been built, and I think everyone understood that we could either run the whole thing into the ground if we failed to get along, or we could try to find a way to respect one another and create a new common ground”*

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Trust has been built, and collaboration takes place between partners who were not initially expected to be able to work together, and this is especially pronounced in the four mission boards.


Building trust takes time and to create the productive matches between project partners it can also be desirable to provide opportunities to meet people with the right chemistry. An informant describes collaboration with project partners in this way:

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*“It also comes down to chemistry. [...] It has been quite decisive for how far we’ve come, because every time we’ve faced a problem, we’ve also been able to solve it — because we’re good at tackling difficult issues and thinking things through together”*

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Figure 11: Productive interactions



### 5.2.5 Ownership and willingness to invest

When assessing engagement among the mission partners, it is fair to note that our information is skewed towards the more engaged segment of the mission partners: Our informants are engaged mission members, and we expect the survey respondents to be the more engaged part of the mission partners. The relatively low response rate could in itself be interpreted as low mission engagement, though survey fatigue probably also plays a role.

To assess the degree of ownership, we have asked about the strategic alignment between the mission and the partner organisation. Around two-thirds of respondents report a good strategic alignment or full strategic anchoring of the mission goals in their organisation, while 25% consider the mission relevant, but not a strategic priority. The final 10% of respondents are mainly involved to access knowledge, networks, or funding, or to avoid missing potential opportunities, as shown in Figure 12. More than half of the respondents report active or proactive engagement, and only 14% report minimal contribution or passive participation. Considering that the more engaged could be more likely to respond, these negative responses may be understated.

When asked about the opportunities of being a partner in the mission, respondents report access to funds and networks as the most important reasons, closely followed by access to knowledge and collaborators. Half of the respondents also mention contributing to the mission goal.

Some partners feel that they are part of something bigger and describe it in various ways:

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*"We are in this together, and it's not about grabbing what you can for your own field"*

*"I get a special feeling in my stomach"*

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
In particular, board members are engaged and invest a lot of voluntary time in board work.

The reported investment of time and resources is highest among researchers from knowledge institutions, and companies find it more difficult to dedicate time to mission activities. This tendency is also reflected in a lower response rate from companies than knowledge institutions. At the end of projects, it sometimes becomes clear that companies have been less involved than originally planned.

All missions experience that Principle Investigators (PIs) need to be well-equipped to ensure the active involvement of partners, communicate information effectively, or maintain progress. For the first pool of projects, PIs were not onboarded into the mission approach, and the missions are developing new approaches to strengthen the PI onboarding. The aim is to create a common understanding of what it means to be a part of a mission and to empower the PIs to ensure engagement and joint progress across project partners.



Figure 12: Ownership and willingness to invest



### 5.2.6 Applied learning

Strategic learning is a central way in which mission-oriented innovation differ from traditional funding instruments. The board decisions over the mission’s long- and short-term strategic direction, active portfolio management and prioritisation of mission activities should all be guided by continuous learning. The Impact Framework for Mission-oriented Innovation provides a frame for learning, and through the development of mission-specific impact frameworks, the missions are starting to adopt a more systematic approach to strategic learning. For instance, MissionGreenFuels and TRACE have built learning questions from their impact frameworks into their recent calls for projects. How learning can be used to document mission progress in practice is still under development.

Learning between mission projects is thought to strengthen project impact potentials. To understand how mission partners engage in learning activities, we distinguished between learning within projects, sharing project learnings with other mission partners, and learning from other mission partners.

Own learning within project partners is predominantly intentional or systematic, as reported by respondents in Figure 13. Only a few reports sharing their learnings proactively in the mission partnerships, and project learning is primarily shared if they are invited to do so or if there is a clear occasion. As one project partner said when asked about sharing learning:

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*“Actually, nobody has asked” [me to share learning]*

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
This shows that the secretariats play an important role in facilitating sharing of results and learning across projects. With limited secretariat resources, it would be interesting to explore how project partners could become more proactive in creating project synergies.

Half of the respondents report that they draw learning from other mission partners occasionally, while the other half do not experience learning from other projects useful or visible. Only three respondents systematically and actively obtain learning from other mission partners. An informant provides a good example of occasional—and untimely—knowledge sharing: They received a guide for obtaining a pivotal permission from another mission partner – however, this took place after they had already spent many resources navigating the regulation and obtaining the permission themselves.

Mission secretariats organise occasions where knowledge sharing across projects takes place, such as annual conferences or PI meetings, and the reported learning across projects is most likely a result of these efforts. Meanwhile, partnership activities could be more intentionally designed to foster timely learning and synergies across the portfolio. TRACE has developed a platform for collecting learning and creating cross-project synergies in TRACE Academy, and other missions are experimenting with different formats.

Learning activities are not only relevant between projects to create synergies in the portfolio. Mission secretariats continuously learn and adjust their processes and activities as a part of their mission approach, although they also lack systematic approaches for doing so. The INNO-CCUS secretariat describes a strong learning culture as part of its DNA.

Figure 13: Applied learning



### 5.2.7 Trust in decision-making

To unpack the partners' views on mission governance, we focus on transparency in funding decisions and inclusion in the strategic direction of the mission.

More than half of the respondents report full or good transparency around funding decisions, but a substantial minority have limited insight into how funding is allocated. The respondents experience varying degrees of inclusion in the strategic direction, with the most common view being that they are invited to provide input but are not meaningfully involved in shaping strategic priorities.

As the mission partnerships differ, there are also different views on the importance of including the broader partnership in setting the strategic direction. INNO-CCUS has a clear, political mandate, and mission management argues that including the broader partnership in setting strategic direction would be too time-consuming for partners. Around 40% of their respondents report minimal or no inclusion, but the mission management does not experience a demand for stronger inclusion.

For other missions with a less clear political mandate, broad inclusion of partners may be important to maintain ownership and willingness to invest.

Given that mission boards consist of vested partners in the mission, the boards have rotation schemes to help prevent any single party from accumulating too much influence. Over time, a strong shared understanding has developed among initial board members that they are not there to promote the interests of their own organisation, but to serve the common mission, as mentioned in Section 4.1.4. When new members join as part of the rotation system, challenges arise when some initially perceive their role as securing resources for their own field or organisation. Onboarding them into the mission mindset is therefore important to ensure that they are oriented towards the collective mission goals. This requires careful calibration:


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*“There were some seasoned businesspeople who tried to look out for their own interests, and I had to make it clear once, during the initial negotiations — that’s not how we play. I received backing from other board members”*

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It is helpful when the secretariats clearly administer rules regarding conflict of interest, which are important because boards consist of partners who also apply for funds. However, it can be challenging to determine at what strategic level conflicts of interest apply: it is obvious when making funding decisions, but more unclear when setting strategic direction, e.g. through deciding focus area for upcoming calls.

Figure 14: Trust in decision-making



### 5.2.8 Necessary resources and competencies

Mission secretariats face two types of tasks that require different competencies and separate resources. First, they are responsible for administering the distribution of project funds in a legal and trustworthy manner, much like IFD, operating more or less as secondary innovation funding agencies. Second, they are expected to play the strategic role as a change agency supporting the enablers for change and fostering mission value added both through the project portfolio and directly through the partnership.

Overall, the partners find that the secretariats handle administration well and play a strategic role, though only 15% report that the secretariats proactively support synergies and learning towards the mission goals.


IFD has provided administrative support for the missions, particularly in the first years, and the mission secretariats have been strengthened over time. Setting up administrative procedures has dominated their work the first years, leaving limited resources to foster productive interactions and strategic learning. The administrative set-ups are each customised to fit into systems in their hosting organisation, instead of having a shared administrative set-up and system support from IFD. The advantage of this approach is that the mission secretariats can draw on hosting organisations' administrative resources, while the drawback has been that they needed to develop four separate set-ups instead of one common one. The new governance model gives the secretariats a stronger mandate, and thereby a greater responsibility and – some argue – a heavier administrative workload.

Mission secretariats all emphasise in unison that it is difficult to dedicate time to the mission-oriented work of strengthening the enablers for change, as the administrative burden is heavy. They express concern that, if their role becomes primarily that of a secondary funding agency undertaking tasks similar to IFD's, the fund itself would be better placed to carry out such functions efficiently. They see their role as extending beyond administrative tasks but do not feel they have had the resources to fulfil this broader mandate. IFD acknowledge that mission activities require resources and have increased the proportion of funds for these activities over time. At the same time, IFD point to unused funds within some secretariats and argues that their resource constraints may not be as severe as presented.

Taking a different approach to publicly funded research and innovation requires new mindsets, and the mission-oriented approach has gradually evolved. There are still divergencies across actors in the understanding of what a mission-approach entails. Holding on to new mindsets requires continuity. Here we note that both mission boards and the IFD mission team have been challenged by rotation schemes and employee turnover, respectively.

Developing research and innovation missions as a new funding instrument and adopting a trial-and-error approach to refine the instrument and unlock its mission potential, requires more than the usual administrative resources needed to disburse public funding. This was not acknowledged by politicians when they invented the Innomissions, and the understanding of what it takes is only slowly emerging. The traditional idea that the funds are most productive when allocated to projects is still present among actors across the mission governance chain and impedes implementation of a full mission-oriented approach.

Figure 15: Necessary resources and competencies



### 5.3 The role of Impact Frameworks in mission-orientation

Another way of assessing what characterizes the way the Innomissions have interpreted the task of working mission-oriented is to examine the mission-specific impact frameworks, which the Innomissions submitted to IFD by 1 September 2025.

As mentioned in Section 3.2, IFD introduced an Impact Framework in the summer of 2024. The introduction of the Impact Framework was a response to an impression of the missions working with the roadmaps without the necessary focus on where they would make the greatest impact.

The Impact Framework first introduced the idea of evaluating progress as the ability to learn and adjust the path accordingly towards the North Star of the mission. This concept of learning being the primary measure of progression was accompanied by the idea that the missions should be more precise in identifying where new knowledge was mostly needed, and, based on this, formulate learning questions that would in turn serve as a basis for new calls.

The impact framework also asked the missions to select only 3–5 tipping points that, according to their current knowledge, would be important and feasible to influence with the resources available to the missions. Identifying tipping points—or inflection points—was not a new task for the missions. This concept was introduced when they were asked to develop their initial roadmaps. But the selection of only a few tipping points was new and coupled with a clearer understanding of a tipping point marking a situation where positive change accelerates and becomes self-sustainable.

Finally, the impact framework introduced the concept of enabling preconditions for change as the mortar between the bricks (projects) necessary for the missions to achieve more than the sum of their individual projects.

In 2025, the missions were asked to deliver fully developed impact frameworks and present it to IFD. In this section, we take a closer look at the impact frameworks as another source for assessing how mission orientation is implemented in the Innomissions.

The first observation is that developing impact frameworks represents a significant challenge to the missions, and they have struggled to finalise them within the deadline of 1 September 2025. The impact framework introduces a new way of tackling the profound uncertainty of how to reach the North Star of the missions moving from keeping the many possible paths outlined in the roadmaps open to selecting a few as the most likely given the current level of knowledge. This change in attitude towards uncertainty is clearly challenging and putting the boards of the missions under pressure. As a result, the impact frameworks as presented to IFD are to some extent work in progress being either first drafts or not yet fully developed.

Investigating the impact frameworks represents a task worthy of a separate study which is beyond the scope of this learning-oriented evaluation. However, we have examined them as an indicator for how the missions work mission-oriented and guided by Figure 4, where working mission-oriented is narrowed down to project selection, project implementation, and continuation of innovation as key differences between missions and other methods of distributing funds for innovation purposes.

### **5.3.1 Project selection**

All four Innomissions acknowledge the need to operationalise the very broad roadmaps and set clearer priorities to increase their impact, taking into account their, after all, limited resources. For most of them, the Impact Framework clearly represents a link between, on the one hand, the very broad roadmaps, which map out all possible ways forward, and, on the other hand, the project portfolios. In the annual reports for 2024 the Innomissions clearly indicate the importance of having a tool and a framework for this.

We believe that the Innomissions would have embarked on the journey to narrow their focus even without the impact framework. They in a sense, matured to a stage where they were ready to focus. But the impact framework has underlined the importance of doing so and made it a clear requirement, both accelerating the process and setting a high common standard.



The Impact Frameworks submitted to the IFD also very clearly demonstrate how difficult the task of focusing under circumstances of profound uncertainty is. The frameworks appear to be “in progress”, and we see room for improvement both in terms of further operationalization and for some of them an even narrower scope. But we feel confident that the impact framework processes have pushed the missions towards a situation where project selection will be clearly different from a situation with i.e. a thematic call within the same fields as the missions.

### **5.3.2 Project implementation**

Whether the Impact Framework will imply a different approach to project implementation than in other programmes remains to be seen. Enablers for change have been treated quite differently in the submitted frameworks. Some have paid intense attention to enablers for change, some have done so more lightly, and some have not addressed this part of the impact framework - most likely because attention has been focused on inflection points and learning questions concerning the project portfolio rather than on enablers for change.

But by stressing enablers for change as a supplement to the project portfolio, attention is directed towards i.e. cross-sectoral collaboration, strategic learning, and capacity building – areas to which the missions are clearly paying more attention now than earlier in their development. And with a stronger alignment towards mission goals, synergies and learning across projects become much more likely. We therefore believe that project implementation will change in the coming years, and more attention will be paid to cross-project collaboration and mutual exchange of experiences.

### **5.3.3 Continuation of innovation**

The clearer focus of the project portfolio following the selection of fewer tipping points holds strong potential to ensure that innovation accelerates through the linkage of relevant implementation partners or by missions providing additional funding for promising projects.

In particular, two of the submitted impact frameworks hold a clear promise that projects will, to a large extent, form well-defined paths of innovation moving forward towards their respective tipping points and ultimately their North Star. The two remaining impact frameworks have not yet clearly outlined how they will form innovation pathways, but both hold the potential as they have narrowed their focus and increased their attention towards continuous learning.

## **5.4 Five paradoxes in publicly funded missions-oriented innovation**

The eight dimensions of working mission-oriented should not be seen as a simple recipe to follow to ensure mission success. Rather, these are important dimensions to navigate over time acknowledging that some dimensions are interdependent, where efforts to strengthen one dimension inevitably will weaken another. In this section, we describe these interdependencies through five paradoxes listed in Figure 16 and unfolded below.

It may shift over time which dimension need strengthening for mission progress, and it requires trial, error and learning to navigate the paradoxes of publicly funded mission-oriented innovation.



Figure 16: The five paradoxes of publicly funded mission-oriented innovation



### 5.4.1 Top-down vs bottom-up

Mission work requires a clear strategic direction, but also engagement from the partners. Clear guidance ensures focus and direction, while involvement can mobilise knowledge, creativity, and broader capacity for action. Accordingly, setting the common mission goal is closely linked to ownership and willingness to invest. As one informant puts it:

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*“If they don’t feel ownership, it will not happen”*

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The initial process of creating roadmaps and forming partnerships took a bottom-up approach, and that has created a strong ownership across the value chain with engagement of key business actors in all missions. However, the roadmaps showed limited direction, and the introduction of the Impact Framework has been a push for a stronger top-down approach with a more focused direction. The mission boards and secretariats have struggled to focus because they fear that it implies limited ownership among partners who do not see their own interests reflected in a narrower focus. However, in 2024/25 we have seen the mission boards stepping into a role as mission owners, moving towards a clearer focus and showing an emerging readiness to deselect focus areas that were initially prioritised. Consequently, we have added an arrow indicating the shift from the initial bottom-up approach towards a more balanced approach.



**5.4.2 Coalition of the willing vs broad partnership**

A narrow partnership among the most engaged can create momentum and visible results. A broader partnership can increase the potential for change but requires more coordination and time to establish a common direction. As missions have adopted a broad partnership approach, they have spent time establishing and renegotiating the common direction. Their transformational potential is large, because they have engaged most key actors within their fields. Focusing the direction, as we have seen recently, invites a move away from the very broad partnership, towards the willing partners who are ready to engage and to invest time towards mission impact. Therefore, we have added a slightly smaller arrow indicating our understanding of the recent development of the Innomissions. However, it is important to maintain the transformational potential of the mission partnerships, and it should be underlined that we have not observed any negative consequences for the partnerships yet, such as important actors leaving the partnership.



**5.4.3 Clear goal and direction vs emergence and agility**

Political and administrative governance requires clear goals, plans, and documentation. At the same time, complex innovation in a changing context calls for room for ongoing learning, adaptation, and strategic flexibility. A good example is MissionGreenFuels. Soon after the launch of the mission, it became clear that battery technology had improved to the extent that electrifying heavy land transport was profitable and cost-effective, making green fuels less important for this sector. This led to a strategic focus on shipping and aviation. The missions need to be able to respond to the changing landscape that they are navigating in and potentially deviate from existing plans.

However, they still need to keep sight of the North Star they are steering towards and have a clear narrative of their direction to maintain engagement from partners and to be accountable to investors. The missions are working on this balancing act, and the mission-specific Impact Frameworks are intended to strengthen the direction while still allowing for emergence. In some ways, strengthening both sides of the paradox – illustrated with an upward arrow—as an unclear direction also leaves room for manoeuvre. Compliance with the Public Administration Act also plays a role which we unfold as part of the next paradox.



**5.4.4 Administrative control vs strategic professional autonomy**

Governance through formal and well-known requirements and procedures ensures transparency and trust, while strategic professional freedom enables adaptation and decision-making close to concrete challenges.



The distribution of funds from IFD to Innomissions and from Innomissions to partner projects is subject to the Public Administration Act. In general, mission boards and secretariats appreciate the legitimacy they gain when acting under The Danish Public Administration Act using principles of impartiality and equal treatment. However, the process can be long, hampering the agility of the mission boards. Once granted, the funds are tied to the purpose described in the application. When the process from application to IFD to investment agreements between mission boards and mission projects took one or more years many conditions may have changed. This was the case as negotiations over a new governance model took time, which all actors agreed was less than ideal.

IFD has taken note of this paradox and, together with the missions, worked to develop a faster cycle from political mandate, through IFD investments in mission partnerships, to mission investments in projects. The new governance structure also gives more autonomy to the missions, e.g. where the mandate to approve project changes has been delegated from the IFD board to mission boards. To this paradox we have therefore added an arrow moving the balance towards greater room for strategic professional autonomy.



**5.4.5 Arm’s length principle vs co-creation**

Public funding operates under the arm’s-length principle, which requires distance and impartiality between funders and recipients. Yet mission-oriented approaches rely on co-creation, where funders and stakeholders collaboratively shape goals and instruments – creating an inherent tension between neutrality and partnership.

Initiating missions without having fully developed the appropriate instrument has required numerous adjustments through trial-and-error. Actually, this could be a productive way to move forward, where solutions are developed along the way as the needs and circumstances are better known than if they had been designed from the beginning.

Since 2023, IFD has dedicated resources to develop the mission instrument in close dialogue with the Innomissions. From the perspective of the Innomissions, the IFD mission team has been struggling to balance two different roles, and it has not been clear what their mandate was in terms of co-creating how the Innomissions are administered with the missions themselves.

While the mission secretariats experience that some formats and structures set out by IFD impose an excessive administrative burden or are inappropriate, they at the same time experience the IFD mission team to be willing to listen, adjust and to some extent co-create. Uncertainty about the legal boundaries for co-creation remains and sometimes constitutes a barrier to co-creation. At the same time, IFD sometimes experience that the Innomissions prefer independence over co-creation. But we clearly observe a willingness to engage in closer co-creation at both IFD and mission secretariats and therefore has added an arrow moving the balance from a clear arm’s length position to a more co-creational position.



The five paradoxes are used solely to describe the situation and the development, we have observed. We do not have experiences to underpin certain positions as more productive than others. The main point is that regardless of the position taken, there is always a price.

We therefore suggest that the paradoxes can be used as a language and a tool for dialogue between IFD and the Innomissions when new situations and needs arise which may require renegotiation of the balances to optimise the productive potential of the Innomissions.

## 5.5 Conclusion: How do the Innomission work mission-oriented?

In this section we have assessed the four Innomissions along eight dimensions of working mission-oriented. The overall impression is that the Innomissions work mission-oriented to a much higher degree today than they did the first couple of years, while there is still room for improvement. The Innomissions have established strong partnerships with relevant research and industry actors and have established well-functioning procedures for distributing project funds in a legal and legitimate way. Roadmaps have set out ambitious common goals for the partnerships but have been too broad to provide the strategic focus necessary for the Innomission investments.

The mission partnerships are currently undergoing a process of prioritisation, where the first step has been to develop mission-specific impact frameworks, and the next step will be to take the consequences through narrower calls towards areas with high impact potential. The missions have made significant progress in establishing the enabling conditions for creating transformative change, but some dimensions still need to be strengthened: Though they have established strong partnerships with engagement and ownership among actors, public authorities and civil society actors are still underrepresented. The common mission goal set in their new impact frameworks still needs to be communicated in the partnership and ecosystem for some of the missions. All missions need to engage in strategic portfolio management, ensuring that projects are selected according to mission needs and strengthening cohesion between projects. Real change occurs through productive interactions, and this is where the partnerships all rate lowest. The missions are on a journey to build learning from both the project portfolios, mission activities and the ecosystem into their governance, and this dimension should continue to be strengthened.

The understanding of what it means to work mission-oriented has developed since the launch of the Innomissions, as both the partnerships and IFD have worked to translate the broad and ambitious political ideas into practical action. Some dimensions have been clear from the start—such as having a common goal and the right partners in the partnership—whereas the practical implementation of other dimensions is still under development—e.g. strategic portfolio management, productive interactions and strategic learning.

This in turn raises the question of resources and competencies. We note that the competencies required to administer projects are not the same as required to facilitate productive interactions, learning etc., and the secretariats were established focusing on selecting and administrating projects. The Innomission secretariats feel that they have lacked the necessary resources to focus on enablers for change to the extent they would have preferred. However, it is not only a question of resources. It has gradually become clear how important a part of working mission-oriented it is to focus on the enablers for change.



In our view, both the Innomissions and IFD have embarked on a learning journey which has accelerated in the last period. We see the relatively positive self-evaluations to the rubrics described in Section 5.2 in this light: They are doing better than before. This, in our view, is inherent in the Danish approach where the four missions were established within a relatively short time span given the complexity of the task. The mission approach will probably continue to develop as the Innomissions progress and new needs and learnings emerge.

It has taken the first couple of years to tune in on a mission-oriented approach and there is still important room for improvement. This should be kept in mind when assessing the value added of the mission-oriented approach, which we turn to in the next section.



## 6 Does the mission-oriented approach add the promised value?


Has the mission approach brought us closer to the political ambition of GHG reductions? Could the same projects in the mission portfolios have been initiated and implemented through IFD, saving the resources spent on mission set-up? And do the partnerships bring direct value beyond the project portfolio? These questions emerge naturally in the minds of decision makers and the funding agency IFD. In this section, we draw attention to these questions acknowledging that it is premature to provide clear answers. We start by arguing why and describe our approach to assess the value added.

### 6.1 Approach to assess the value added

To truly assess whether a mission approach has generated value, it must first be fully implemented and put into practice. And to fully implement a mission approach requires a common and clear understanding of what the mission approach entails. In Section 3, we describe how IFD launched the Innomissions with strong political expectations, but limited guidance on what the mission approach meant in practice. The mission approach has evolved like a funnel - gradually narrowing and becoming more defined as implementation progressed and experience accumulated over time. Section 4 contributes to this progression by outlining the impact pathways for the mission partnerships and setting out eight dimensions of mission-oriented work that enable this impact. We have employed these to assess how the mission partnerships work mission-oriented in Section 5. As the mission approach has been shaped over time, so has the mission partnerships' implementation of the approach gradually developed. The secretariats have shifted from being mainly preoccupied with administrative procedures to a stronger strategic role. However, the mission approach still needs to be strengthened if the missions are to realise their potential for transformative impact on Danish society and make a significant contribution to the required reduction in GHG emissions.

Taking a mission approach entails a large investment up front: building partnerships, developing roadmaps, setting up a governance structure, establishing boards and secretariats—and in this case developing the approach itself over time. Naturally, this approach extends the time from political funding decisions to the initiation of research and innovation projects. As an old proverb says: "If you want to go fast – go alone. If you want to go far – go together." In Figure 17 we hypothesise how the value added of a mission approach evolves over time where the large initial investment makes missions contribute less to *immediate* GHG reduction solutions than traditional funding instruments would. With the coordination and momentum that missions can create, they could have a larger transformative potential in the longer run. We believe that the largest investment has been made at the time of this evaluation, while the larger transformative potential is still ahead. We have illustrated this point with a vertical dashed line indicating hypothetical timing of the evaluation.

Figure 17: Value added of mission approach over time



It is therefore premature to make a final judgement on whether the mission approach can deliver greater value than traditional funding instruments, but we will here outline the potentials we have observed. We start with a brief reflection on the GHG reduction potentials of the four Innomissions. We then assess the potential value added of the Innomissions, and we structure this assessment around the impact pathways outlined in Section 4.1:

- Project portfolio value through
  - Initiating better projects
  - Strengthening project implementation
  - Enabling impact of project innovation
- Direct partnership value beyond project portfolio

These pathways focus on the mission partnerships, which operate under conditions from the political layer, IFD and their ecosystem. We end the section by unfolding these conditions for the Innomissions' ability to create value added.

## 6.2 GHG emission reduction potentials

The green expert group under the Ministry of Higher Education and Science points to three general types of potential for GHG reductions from research and innovation initiatives: Reduction of national emissions; reduction of national footprint; and reduction of global emissions.<sup>4</sup>

While the political initiative to the four Innomissions was motivated by the Danish Climate Act stipulating targets for reduction of GHG emissions from national production, only two of the four missions have a clear political ambition to reduce Danish GHG emissions: INNO-CCUS aims to capture domestic carbon emissions and either use or store them, and AgriFoodTure aims to reduce GHG emissions from domestic agricultural and food production. The climate potentials of the two remaining missions are primarily beyond national borders: Since electrification is proving effective for heavy road transport, MissionGreenFuels prioritises shipping and aviation - sectors with major global emissions, where Danish solutions can deliver substantial climate impact beyond Denmark's GHG accounts. Similarly, TRACE has a potential to reduce Danish footprint on imported plastic and textiles, but only a smaller domestic potential as just a fraction of the Danish consumption of plastic and textiles is produced within national borders.

<sup>4</sup> See Section 6.2 in [Expert group on research influence on the green transition \(2024\) "A tool for assessment of green research and innovation initiatives"](#).

Estimation of these reduction potentials is beyond the scope of this evaluation. We proceed to reflect on the Innomissions' efforts to realise their potentials through their project portfolio and partnership.

### 6.3 Project portfolio value added

First, we assess the indications of value added of the mission-oriented approach through the project portfolio. For the mission approach to fulfil its potential the project portfolio should entail a higher potential than a comparable set of individual projects. To unpack this potential, we start considering how projects are selected within the Innomissions to assess if they have better preconditions for climate impact. Then we in turn reflect on the conditions for project implementation and continuation. It is beyond the scope of this evaluation to assess mission project portfolios in detail to understand if the specific projects selected for funding have higher potentials, are better implemented and whether promising innovation ideas are more likely to be implemented when project funds run out. Instead, we provide our impression of the conditions for project selection and implementation.

#### 6.3.1 Initiating better projects

A central premise of the mission approach is that it should initiate projects, which are more strategically aligned, mutually reinforcing, and more likely to generate impact than traditional stand-alone projects. While there are signs that project selection has improved over time, challenges remain.

The mission roadmaps have provided direction for project selection, but do not yet offer sufficient focus to ensure strong coherence across project portfolios. The early Pool 1 projects fell under mission themes but were not the result of clear strategic choices. Projects initiated in later pools are considered to have a better strategic fit, and the introduction of the impact framework is expected to help narrow focus and guide project selection through focus areas and shared learning questions.

The governance structure is challenging for the strategic selection of projects. Board members' dual roles as both decision-makers and partners introduce conflicts of interest that limit who can participate in discussions on the overall strategic coherence of portfolios—ironically excluding those with deep professional insight. The forthcoming plan to narrow project calls based on clearly defined focus areas and learning questions holds potential to strengthen strategic alignment and improve portfolio cohesion. However, this approach has not yet been implemented in practice. Some stakeholders express concern that narrowing the scope of calls might reduce the number of applications—and possibly limit competition and diversity of ideas.

There are indications in the survey data and among informants that the missions have fostered more meaningful partnerships matches over time. In addition, several actors note that new collaborations among mission partners have emerged outside the mission portfolio, suggesting a positive spill-over effect. Overall, the ability to initiate better projects appears to be improving as the missions mature, both with a greater strategic focus and through matching the right partners.



### 6.3.2 Strengthening project implementation

While mission projects should be initiated to strategically fit the mission goals, they should also be implemented in alignment with the impact they are selected to create. In general, project partners let mission goals guide decisions in their projects and experience the possibility to adjust project plans towards impact as they learn. However, not all experience that it is possible to adjust their project plans according to learnings. Whether this is a sign that they are not able to reach the full potential impact, or whether it is a sign of sound administration of public funds that the project plans cannot be diverted too much is difficult for us to judge without diving into concrete projects. It is important to note that not all project participants are aware that their project is part of the mission—and this is a clear indication that not all projects benefit from the mission anchoring.

Projects that are diverting from the mission goal or that show to be unpromising should be closed to divert funds where they create most impact. The data collected does not allow us to conclude whether project closure is more prevalent among the missions than in IFD's other funding instruments. But through dialogue with mission secretariats, IFD have adjusted guidelines to make project closure easier.

The mission roadmaps mean to install a clear link between research and industry: they describe how research efforts tie to desired industry accomplishments which further link to the long-term mission goal. Furthermore, the missions have created a widespread understanding that technological solutions are embedded in society and that a holistic view and interdisciplinary collaboration are needed to achieve implementation of new solutions. The missions will only achieve their goals of GHG reductions if the research and innovation ideas are fully implemented in practice, and informants stress how the missions have created a growing recognition – in particular among technological researchers and developers—that implementation requires a systems view.

Links between research and industry are established in the partnership projects, and cross-cutting mission activities can serve to create more links and foster a system view through shared learning and synergies across projects. According to survey respondents, interaction and knowledge sharing across projects take place and are experienced as valuable. This suggests that the missions strengthen valuable links, which should be considered an accomplishment—though we still see room for fostering more productive interactions among mission partners.

The mission secretariats and boards are in the process of strengthening their positions to address necessary conditions for project success, such as regulation or infrastructure. We have not met examples of projects that have experienced that the mission partnership has addressed necessary conditions for project success, but this does not necessarily imply that they do not exist. INNO-CCUS has strong ties to authorities and could potentially be in a position to influence policies related to carbon capture, usage and storage. The merger between AgriFoodTure and Food&Bio Cluster may lead to a more influential organisation in time, but currently the internal merger process draws a lot of resources – potentially also away from influencing important external conditions for mission success in the shorter term.

We find that the bottom-up mission approach has fostered strong ownership among mission partners. This is reflected through reported strategic alignment in the survey and in conversations with informants. Multiple informants point out that industry partners have taken part in drawing up the roadmap towards the mission goal and thereby find the funding instrument highly relevant for them. Based on these indications, there could be a potential for mission projects to be better anchored in participating companies than other innovation projects.

### **6.3.3 Continuation of innovation implementation**

Ownership and anchoring of the innovation ideas are important prerequisites for further continuation and implementation. We are not in a position to conclude whether innovation ideas from mission projects are implemented after project completion to a larger extent than other innovation projects, but all four missions have examples of successful projects that have been continued either with additional mission funding, EU funding, through new consortia across multiple projects, or through partner implementation.

A part of strategic portfolio management is to have a progressive portfolio where promising projects are strengthened with additional mission funding. However, administrative rules emphasising open calls and scientific review processes challenge such strategic priorities. One approach could be to employ stage-gate models, but such funding instruments have not yet been developed. IFD has been in dialogue with one mission on other legal models for top-up calls, and finding a legal foundation to top up promising projects will be important as many Pool 1 projects are coming to an end. This will strengthen the ability to secure implementation of the innovative ideas with great potential to contribute to the mission goal.

Another way of extending the innovation beyond the project grant period is to extract and share learnings as projects are completed. The missions are developing formats for this, e.g. through PI interviews with secretariat and board members when projects close, as is done in Mission-GreenFuels. Many projects are still underway, and it will be interesting to track the continuation and implementation of these innovation ideas in the future.



## 6.4 Direct partnership value beyond project portfolio

Beyond the project portfolio, the missions have generated substantial partnership value that several actors consider fundamental to the promise of the mission approach. As already noted, all four missions were established as broad partnerships, and many informants describe a remarkable cultural shift since their inception. Relationships previously characterised by competition for funding have, to a large extent, been replaced by partnerships built on commitment, trust and a shared sense of direction. Researchers and industry actors who once worked in silos are now engaging in more open and constructive dialogue; even researchers from different disciplines - or from the same discipline but different universities - appear to listen to one another with greater respect. There is a striking contrast between the situation before the missions and the one mission representatives describe today, and this should be recognised as a major achievement in itself.

The important role of tying new relationships is also reflected in the survey responses, where three out of four respondents identify networking as a key opportunity arising from participating in a mission partnership. Actors are getting to know one another better, and new ideas are emerging from these networks, forming the basis for collaboration both within and beyond mission-funded projects. Although it is difficult to assess the full magnitude of this change without a formal baseline, the collective shift away from fragmentation and towards a more integrated ecosystem stands out clearly across interviews. The 2019 peer review criticised the Danish research and innovation system for being fragmented,<sup>5</sup> and these findings suggest that the mission approach has succeeded to address part of this critique.

Though the mission partnerships have led to a higher degree of ecosystem coordination, we find that coordination at the political level across ministries and across other funding bodies is not complete. While some other funding actors have adopted mission roadmaps, we do not see public funding schemes within mission domains to consistently refer to the roadmaps. Who is in the best position to carry the responsibility for this type of coordination? We assess that such alignment with national programmes and broader political initiatives might have been managed more effectively at ministerial level. The missions were initiated under the Ministry of Higher Education and Science as research and innovation missions, and other relevant sector ministries have not consistently taken ownership or aligned their policies and funding streams with the Innomissions. The government initiative to speed up green solutions point to the importance of a holistic approach. A first step to implement this ambition has been a wish to have observers from relevant sector ministries in mission boards, but only AgriFoodTure has observers to date. Internationally, mission-oriented innovation policies strive for alignment of policies across research funding, financial incentives, regulation and targeted investments,<sup>6</sup> and it is not common to outsource the alignment of policies and regulation towards a mission goal to a bottom-up partnership. We assess that it is not reasonable to expect the mission partnerships to shoulder this task of political alignment.

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<sup>5</sup> European Commission (2019) "Peer Review of the Danish R&I System"

<sup>6</sup> [OECD Mission Action Lab](#)

Coordination and new relationships are not sufficient to drive strong partnership value towards the achievement of GHG reductions—the participating partners also need to be engaged in the mission work. We find that the bottom-up approach leading to broad partnerships has fostered strong engagement. Important actors across the value chain, including major industry players with decisive influence on implementation, have become actively involved. Their engagement is considered a necessary condition for achieving the missions' goals. Though mission partnerships cannot be expected to ensure alignment of government policies, they need to engage public authorities to a larger extent in order to be able to address the systemic barriers to implementation of innovation ideas.

We find that the missions are increasingly evolving into learning hubs with the potential to support partners in navigating a rapidly changing context. They are becoming better at directing attention to areas with the highest potential for impact, aided by the strategic processes that underpin the development of mission-specific impact frameworks. These processes have brought the missions closer to a shared strategic focus, and some are initiating efforts to capture relevant learnings more systematically from both the project portfolio and the surrounding ecosystem. As the missions strengthen their ability to address systemic and regulatory barriers, this is expected to generate spill-over effects that go beyond mission-funded activities and support faster implementation of innovative ideas contributing to mission goals.

## 6.5 Conditions affecting Innomissions' value added

Zooming out from the mission partnerships to their governance chain, several conditions have limited the extent to which the Innomissions have been able to realise their full value added. Starting at the political level, a key constraint has been the lack of political alignment across relevant ministries. As discussed earlier, the missions were launched under the Ministry of Higher Education and Science, and other sector ministries did not consistently take ownership or align policies, funding streams, or regulatory initiatives with the missions. This fragmentation has made it more difficult to pursue a genuinely mission-oriented approach, which by definition requires system-wide coordination.

A related challenge concerns the varying levels of understanding of what a mission approach entails. Many actors entered the process with expectations shaped by traditional research and innovation funding mechanisms. However, achieving mission goals requires a system perspective and strong strategic capabilities within the mission secretariats. While mission funds are formally designated as research and innovation funds, the nature of mission work necessitates investments beyond project portfolio administration—particularly in fostering portfolio synergies and more productive interactions, installing strategic learning from the portfolio, activities and the ecosystem, and continued coordination and partner engagement.

The current funding set-up has also posed limitations. Annual allocations tied to the fiscal budget require the missions to apply for funding each year, creating a substantial administrative burden. On the one hand, this design is an intentional lever for IFD to ensure mission impact and reduce the risk of mission drift or capture. On the other hand, it introduces uncertainty and absorbs time that could otherwise be directed towards strategic work. The limited visibility on the future availability of mission funds makes long-term strategic planning difficult. The recent research reserve agreement earmarking 1.2 billion DKK for missions over four years may alleviate some of these challenges going forward.



Competition between missions over funding as stipulated in yearly agreements on the research reserve is another factor affecting value creation. Typically, funds have been distributed relatively evenly despite the competitive application process, which is perceived as administratively heavy. This has reinforced competitive dynamics rather than collaborative synergies between missions. While the competition for funds may serve to strengthen the impact focus in the Innomissions and ensure yearly updates to the mission strategy, there is a potential to reduce the accompanying administrative burden. IFD and mission secretariats are currently investigating this potential.

The requirement for co-funding also plays a role. While it ensures private-sector commitment, it inevitably steers attention towards commercially attractive activities, which may not always align with the broader system needs required to achieve the mission goals. Co-funding requirements are a consequence of the type of research and innovation funding instrument, but the Innomissions can prioritise calls with lower co-funding requirements—an example is an AgriFoodTure call for social science and humanities projects. This prioritisation comes at a cost of a larger co-funding requirement on other calls.

A further set of conditions relates to the interface between IFD and the mission secretariats. Both sides emphasise the importance of developing the mission approach through learning, yet we encountered notable disagreement between them leading to mutual frustration. Secretariats feel they are expected to deliver more than their current resources allow, whereas IFD does not perceive the same degree of imbalance between expectations and available resources. This divergence may also stem from insufficient alignment of expectations regarding the role and responsibilities of the secretariats. Meanwhile, we find value in the ongoing collaboration between IFD and the secretariats and note genuine efforts to find practical solutions.

Turning to the ecosystems that the Innomissions operate in, the four missions began from very different starting points, and these differences influence how well the research and innovation mission instrument fits each domain. For INNO-CCUS and MissionGreenFuels, the relatively narrow technological focus aligns well with a mission approach, and these missions benefit from a systemic view on implementation. For AgriFoodTure and TRACE, mission goals require broader societal and systemic transformation, where technological achievements may serve as important building blocks but are not the core of the task. Still, we find that the mission approach has generated important ecosystem coordination for these two missions and strengthened the sectors' collective ability to reduce GHG emissions. However, to fully support the systemic efforts required in these more complex mission domains, the current funding instrument may need adjustments to accommodate activities that extend beyond traditional research and innovation projects.

## **6.6 Conclusion: Value added potentials**

Overall, this assessment finds that the mission approach has generated forms of value that extend beyond what can be observed through individual projects alone, while acknowledging that it is still too early to judge if the mission instrument can lead to larger GHG emissions reductions than traditional funding instruments. The Innomissions were launched with strong political ambitions but limited initial operational clarity, and the mission approach has gradually taken shape through practice rather than design. The initial investment has gone into building partnerships, governance and administrative structures.

The most distinctive value added of the mission approach lies in establishing multi-sectoral partnerships which is a key enabler for creating mission impact. The Innomissions have fostered trust, reduced fragmentation, and enabled new collaborations across disciplines and sectors that were previously weakly connected.

The partnerships are currently in the process of sharpening their strategic directions, which is needed for the multi-sectoral collaborations to have transformative impact. The initial projects lacked strategic focus, while the strategic fit of more recent projects has improved and is expected to further narrow as the missions implement their new impact frameworks. The bottom-up approach has built strong ownership and engagement among actors, which can potentially pave the way for long-term implementation of the innovations underway.

To increase the potential of mission value added, the Innomissions still need to strengthen their strategic portfolio management, to foster more productive interactions, and to engage in strategic learning to navigate the changing world and the uncertainties of what can become possible. At the same time, a range of conditions constrain the missions' ability to fully realise their potential, and they should be considered by IFD and the relevant political actors. We turn to these potentials for increasing mission impact in the next section.

Taken together, the findings suggest that the major investments have already been made, while the larger transformative value—if it materialises—lies in the period ahead.



## 7 Could the potential be even better exploited?

The potential of working in a mission-oriented way is not fully exploited in the Danish case, and we conclude the report with recommendations for strengthening the potential of the Innomissions and general learnings for publicly funded research and innovation missions.

We have organised the recommendations by the primary receiver of the messages; The mission secretariats and boards, their interface with IFD, recommendations for IFD, and the political layer. Finally, we have also collected a number of considerations and recommendations for future establishment of missions.

### 7.1 Mission secretariats and boards

**Clear narrative and role:** Mission secretariats and boards should continue strengthening the shared understanding of mission goals across partnerships and clarify and communicate their roles in their ecosystems. The impact frameworks provide a strong basis for a clearer joint narrative, and we recommend using them actively to onboard Principle Investigators and project partners.

**Prioritise based on learning:** The ongoing process of narrowing the missions' focus towards areas with the highest potential impact should continue. This prioritisation should be informed by continuous learning from the project portfolio, mission activities and the surrounding ecosystem, which requires a more structured and systematic approaches to the collection, analysis and application of learnings.

**Leverage partnership trust and include authorities and civil society:** The high trust that has emerged between actors—many of whom previously competed directly—represents an important achievement. There may be further potential to leverage this accomplishment towards achieving mission goals, e.g. through bringing the mission intention into other fora in the ecosystem. The missions should seek to strengthen their partnerships towards public authorities and civil societies, which we also return to below. One potential approach is to strengthen social science and humanities perspectives through targeted calls.

**Create continuation without mission capture:** Board rotation schemes create a discontinuity that impedes momentum. On the one hand, strong onboarding of new board members should be developed and implemented. On the other hand, mission boards could explore other levers to avoid mission capture than fixed rotation schemes.

**Strengthen strategic and progressive portfolio management:** A mindset change is needed from selecting excellent projects to a focus on portfolio contribution of the project—how the project adds to existing projects and relate to the strategic direction. Projects should not be seen as silos, but focus should be on their interplay and interdependencies across projects, and value chain perspectives within projects. New models for portfolio considerations should be explored to address the governance dilemma that a large share of the mission boards have conflicts of interest when many projects are considered simultaneously. Using focus areas, calls for projects should be strategically narrow, but sufficiently broad to attract enough applicants for competition over the funds. Using learning questions, project deliveries should not be fixed KPIs or milestones, but rather the insights and learning the projects collectively generates towards the mission needs. To keep the portfolios progressive, missions should also ensure that projects

can adjust plans in response to new learnings and continue to explore legal models for closing unpromising projects and topping-up those with high impact potential and strategic fit.

**Portfolio synergies and timely learning:** At portfolio level, there is scope to create stronger synergies. Around a third of project partners report limited insight into how their project fits within the wider mission portfolio. We recommend establishing regular sharing formats and mechanisms that enable timely learning across projects. Increased interactions beyond individual projects would support a more integrated portfolio, and missions may explore how project partners can take a more proactive role in sharing knowledge and identifying synergies.

## 7.2 Joint recommendations for the IFD and secretariat interface

**Expectation alignment over mission approach and strategic role:** IFD and the mission secretariats should through dialogue reach a clearer expectation alignment regarding what it means to work mission-oriented, and what missions are expected to achieve, including the strategic role of mission secretariats and considerations of the available funding to take on this role. The current funding scheme for the missions distinguishes between funds for research and innovation projects in the portfolio, and funds for administration and mission activities. A clear distinction between funds for administration and funds for strategic mission efforts to ensure coordination, engagement and strategic learning could potentially help align expectations. There may be legal constraints to allocating strategic funds to the missions to which we return below. In our assessment, if the secretariats are to take on the strategic role necessary to realise the potential of a mission-oriented approach, they will require stronger resourcing than they currently have. This may come at the expense of project funding but will enhance the strategic relevance and impact potential of the projects that are funded.

**Acknowledge and navigate paradoxes:** A part of the needed expectation alignment also relates to navigating the inherent paradoxes in publicly funding mission-oriented innovation. Using the paradoxes in the continuous dialogue between IFD and missions, can help both parties to acknowledge that it is a balancing act and to explore if the current approach needs adjustments.

**Roles for strengthening public authorities and civil society:** Expectation alignment between IFD and the mission secretariats also includes clarifying the possible approaches to strengthen engagement of public authorities and civil-society actors. This includes a clear distribution of roles and responsibilities between IFD and secretariats. Above we noted an approach that the secretariats can take to strengthen social science and humanities perspectives, and below we return to potential approaches for IFD.

**Reducing administrative burden:** There is also considerable potential to reduce administrative burden for both mission secretariats and IFD by adjusting application and reporting requirements. We recommend that IFD map statutory financial reporting requirements and design the simplest possible processes for collecting this information. A similar exercise could be undertaken for progress reporting, with formats co-created to serve both IFD's oversight needs and secretariats' own learning processes. Several actors propose shorter, learning-oriented reporting formats. Streamlining administration—an effort already initiated—could free up valuable secretariat resources in both the missions and IFD.

## 7.3 Innovation Fund Denmark

**Explore legal models for strategic funds:** We recommend that IFD explore the legal possibilities for establishing strategic funds that are neither project nor administrative funds but earmarked for strategic activities required to operate a mission. Secretariats already receive funding for cross-mission activities such as conferences, and some learning activities as a part of their administrative funds, but we find a need to strengthen the strategic capacity of the missions in order to achieve the potential of the mission approach. Whether this requires political earmarking of strategic funds we are not in a position to say.

**Explore co-finance requirement for civil society actors:** In order to strengthen the inclusion of civil society actors, IFD could examine whether voluntary work hours from civil-society actors could legally count as co-financing, which could broaden engagement.

**Building shared understanding of progress with political layer:** In addition, IFD could play a more proactive role in engaging the political layer to build a shared understanding that the mission instrument is different from usual research and innovation instruments. This relates to the political oversight of the missions from the Ministry for Higher Education and Science which will affect reporting on progress throughout the governance chain. Based on the Impact Framework, IFD should build a shared clear understanding with the political system that progress of the missions can be demonstrated through their ability to learn and adjust—that they are accountable to learning and adjusting decisions and actions based on these learnings. A clear shared understanding of what progress reporting entails across the governance chain will reduce continuous changes in reporting formats and thereby contribute to the reduction of the administrative burden.

## 7.4 Political layer

**Clear financial horizon:** The long-term financial commitment to missions is an important enabler for the Innomissions to make strategic dispositions. The model with uncertain yearly funds has not been ideal and the recent decision to secure four years of additional funding is a strong and important step.

**Ministerial and public authority coordination:** While the government initiative to speed up green solutions advocate for a holistic approach, there is still room to strengthen implementation of this approach beyond ministerial observers in mission boards. Greater coordination across sector ministries is needed to ensure alignment of political initiatives and funding instruments around the mission goals. Mission roadmaps could serve as a useful tool for coordinating related initiatives.

**Explore strategic funds for systemic efforts:** There may also be merit in exploring strategic funds for missions that are not restricted to research and innovation activities, but support the broader systemic efforts required to achieve mission goals.

**Secure legal basis for strategic priorities:** A range of legal issues has emerged as the Innomissions progress to work in a mission-oriented way, such as legal basis for providing top-up funds for promising projects, and a new governance model took more than a year to establish because of legal uncertainty about delegation of responsibility. Through dialogue with IFD, the necessary legal basis should be established for the missions to unfold strategic priorities and adapt as they learn.

## 7.5 Learnings for starting new missions

**Coordination of relevant ministries and political initiatives:** The experience from the four current Innomissions points to several important considerations for launching new missions in the future. First, missions benefit greatly from early and active ministerial coordination with the sectoral ministries relevant to the mission domain. This coordination should extend beyond research and innovation funding to include financial incentives, regulation and other political initiatives that shape the wider system in which missions operate.

**Developing mission approach requires separate funding:** It is also clear that developing a new funding instrument requires dedicated resources. In the current set-up, politicians decided that funds should be distributed through missions but allocated limited resources to IFD to operationalise this decision. Although the missions were launched immediately and without a long preparatory period, resources are still needed to ensure continuous learning and adjustment. Without such resources, there is a real risk that the potential will not be realised and that the overall investment will yield limited returns.

**Setting up an international advisory board:** Research and innovation missions are still a new funding instrument and funding agencies and mission management can benefit from advice and guidance from experienced international mission actors. For the Innomissions and IFD, the Mission International Advisory Board has played a central role pushing for the missions to become more focused, and many of their general recommendations have found way into the Impact Framework for Mission-oriented Innovation pushing the Innomissions and IFD to work more mission-oriented.

**Roadmaps describes strategic pathway to mission goal:** A well-designed roadmap is a vital part of any mission. It should describe where the mission intends to go, take stock of the current situation, and outline the journey from the present to the desired future. While the overall format should be provided top-down, broad bottom-up inputs are essential to secure ownership. This requires a time frame that allows for an inclusive process in which the roadmap is refined and strategically focused together with relevant partners before project funds are allocated. Roadmaps could also be subject to quality assessment by international experts. Once a roadmap is established by mission partners, it should be adopted by the innovation agency and the relevant political entities able to ensure political coordination.


**Impact framework for steering and learning:** If roadmaps are not narrowly defining the strategic priorities of the mission partnership but cover the national ecosystem, and impact framework is needed to clarify the strategic direction of the mission partnership and their project portfolio. It should be designed to install learning into partnership, both from the portfolio, mission activities and ecosystem to the secretariat and board to continuously inform strategic decisions, and between projects and partners to foster synergies.

**Long-term financial commitment and exit strategies:** Furthermore, missions benefit from long-term financial commitments and clear exit strategies. From the outset, expectations should be aligned regarding how long funding will last, how far the missions are expected to progress within this funding window, and what is expected to happen thereafter. It should also be clear under which circumstances a mission might be closed and exit strategies could be linked to expectations about when activities can be commercialised. In addition, it should also be possible to close unpromising projects in the mission portfolio to support progressive strategic portfolio

management. Finding the legal basis to do so, e.g. through stage-gate models, is important, which links to the next learning.

**Strong legal and system support:** Rules, regulations and system support have absorbed a substantial amount of administrative capacity, as each mission has had to build administrative structures from scratch or building them into hosting universities structures. Politician should be ready to adjust the legal basis, and stronger legal and system support from the innovation agency might have been more efficient than having four missions independently find their way forward. At the same time, it is important to ensure that stronger central support does not diminish the strategic ownership of mission boards and secretariats but rather frees up strategic capacity.

**Secretariats as change agents:** Finally, secretariats should be regarded as agents of change rather than administrative bodies. This requires a critical mass of human resources. Adequate funding and relevant administrative support for secretariats is necessary to make the most of the mission instrument and to ensure that missions have the capacity to drive strategic learning, coordination and systemic change.



## 8 Appendix: Methods and data

In this appendix we describe the role of Pluss leadership as a learning partner to IFD and the Innomissions and unfold the data foundation for the learning-oriented presentation in this report. Finally, we provide the rubrics underlying the partnership survey to display how we have unpacked the eight dimensions of working mission-oriented seen from a partner perspective.

### 8.1 The role of Pluss Leadership as a learning partner

Apart from conducting this learning-oriented evaluation of the Innomissions, we have also been engaged with:

- IFD in developing the [Impact Framework for Mission-oriented Innovation](#).
- MissionGreenFuels in developing their mission-specific Impact Framework, mapping their portfolio and developing an impact set-up
- AgriFoodTure in developing their mission-specific Impact Framework

As a learning partner, we operate as a critical friend, which means that we can well express criticism of our customers, while also sharing their intention and supporting them in learning, how they can strengthen their potential. Due to our investment in the Impact Framework for Mission-oriented Innovation, we may be challenged to impartially assess this tool. Respondents have generally expressed relief that the Impact Framework provided a common language and drove the partnerships to focus efforts, while one respondent has remarked that the framework was implemented top-down and not co-created with the mission management.

### 8.2 Data foundation for the learning-oriented evaluation

The learning-oriented evaluation at hand relies on four sources of data collected June – September 2025:

3. Documents such as
  - a. Government initiatives
  - b. Roadmaps
  - c. Call texts
  - d. Impact frameworks
  - e. Annual reports
4. Workshops with the four mission secretariats focusing on enablers for change, and a workshop with the IFD mission team focusing on the role of IFD and paradoxes in publicly funded mission-oriented innovation
5. Interviews with four people from each mission: the mission director, a board member, a workstream lead, and a central partner focusing on potentials and barriers to mission-oriented innovation. In addition, we have interviewed the chairperson of the IFD board.
6. A partnership survey focusing on the eight dimensions of working mission-oriented.

Comparing these data sources to the governance value chain of the Innomissions as illustrated in Figure 2, it is clear that the data mainly covers mission secretariats, boards and partners and to a smaller extent IFD. The scope of the evaluation did not allow for data collection among mission projects, interviews with stakeholders at the political layer or external views on the Innomissions from the ecosystem. This implies that the findings in the report primarily reflect impressions and experiences from the mission partnership and to some extent from the IFD mission team.

## 8.2.1 List of informants


Mission	Role	Name	Organisation
<b>INNO-CCUS</b>	Mission director	Karina Søgaard	INNO-CCUS
	Board member	Erling Stenby	DTU Chemistry
	Workstream lead	Claus Beier	Ecosystems and Sustainability at University of Copenhagen
	Central partner	Jesper Damtoft Lars Nielsen	Aalborg Portland GEUS
<b>Mission-GreenFuels</b>	Mission director	Carina Jensen	MissionGreenFuels
	Board member	Per Hesselund Lauritsen	Siemens Gamesa Renewable Energy
	Central project lead	Simon Westergaard Lex	University of Copenhagen, Department of Anthropology
	Central partner	Marie Lund Traulsen	DynElectro
<b>AgriFoodTure</b>	Mission director	Anette Friis	AgriFoodTure
	Board member	Hanne Harmsen	Copenhagen Business School
	Workstream lead	Svend Christensen	KU, Department of Plant and Environmental sciences
	Central partner	Ejnar Schultz	Arla
<b>TRACE</b>	Mission director	Anette Juhl	TRACE
	Board member	Claus Hélix-Nielsen	DTU, Department of Environmental and Resource Engineering
	Workstream lead	Else Skjold	Royal Danish Academy, Institute of Design, Products & Materials
	Central partner	Eva Tansem-Andersen	Abena
<b>IFD</b>	IFD board chairperson	Anders Eldrup	Innovation Fund Denmark

## 8.2.2 Partnership survey

The objective of the survey was to assess eight different dimensions for working mission-oriented seen from a partner perspective. The partnership survey was sent by mission secretariats to all contact persons within mission partners.


Across the four missions, 152 respondents completed the survey resulting in a response rate of 20%. Some survey questions have around 200 respondents as not all respondents completed all questions of the survey. Figure 18 shows the number of full survey responses across the four Innomissions and across organisational types.

Figure 18: Number of survey responses across missions and organisation types



In Figure 19 we show response rates to reflect the survey has been distributed to a varying number of respondents across categories.

Figure 19: Response rates across missions and organisation types



Response rates are particularly low for MissionGreenFuels as it was unable to distinguish between contact persons who are project partners and those who are administrative and economic contact persons and as a consequence, the survey was sent to almost 300 people, among which 241 were from companies. This diminished the response rate considerably for this mission.

Each Innomission partner was asked to evaluate eight different themes with up to three sub-themes in each. The questions bid the partner answer which of 5 descriptions best fits themselves, their project, or their organization.

Some subthemes were only relevant to partners who have or have previously had a project under the Innomission, and those outside this group was not asked these questions. These will be highlighted with the text "(Only asked those *with* a project)" in the first column of the rubric.

Below the underlying rubrics for each dimension of working mission-oriented is listed



## 1. Common mission goal

First, we would like to know your view on the goals and subgoals for the mission partnership – what the mission partnership is striving to achieve in the short and long term.

Please select the description that best describes your view in relation to:

<b>1.a Knowledge and clarity</b>	<b>Clear direction</b> I have deep knowledge of the mission’s goals and sub-goals, and I find that they clearly balance various concerns and are useful for setting direction.	<b>Good overview</b> I know the overall goals and understand the direction, although some elements, subgoals or priorities are unclear.	<b>General awareness</b> I have a general idea of the mission’s goals and direction but lack concrete guidance on how various concerns are balanced in practice.	<b>Limited insight</b> I have superficial knowledge of the mission’s goals, but I am uncertain about the actual direction and subgoals are either not existing or not well aligned with overall goal.	<b>No awareness</b> I don’t know the mission’s goals – or find them so unclear that they are meaningless to me.
<b>1.b Application and adjustment in mission partnership</b>	<b>Continuously relevant reference points</b> The goals are consistently used as reference points in all decisions in the mission partnership, and subgoals are continuously adjusted based on learning.	<b>Mainly used and sometimes adjusted</b> The goals are mainly used to steer important decisions in the mission partnership, and subgoals are sometimes adjusted if needed, but not always.	<b>Sometimes used and rarely adjusted</b> The goals are sometimes, but not consistently, used to guide decisions in the mission partnership, but subgoals are rarely adjusted to remain relevant.	<b>No influence on my work</b> The goals may guide decisions in the mission partnership to some extent, but subgoals are rarely or never updated to remain relevant.	<b>Goals are not applied and outdated</b> Decisions are not guided by the goals or subgoals in the mission partnership – they are unknown or outdated and irrelevant.
<b>1.c.p Application and relevance in my project</b> (Only asked those <i>with</i> a project)	<b>Continuously relevant reference points</b> The mission goals are consistently used as reference points in all decisions in my project.	<b>Mainly used</b> The goals are mainly used to steer important decisions in my project.	<b>Sometimes used</b> The goals are sometimes, but not consistently, used to guide decisions in my project.	<b>Goals used initially</b> The mission goals were used initially to form the project but are not considered when making project adjustments.	<b>Our project idea was within goals</b> Our project goal was not informed by the mission goals but turned out to fit within the mission.

## 2. Strategic project portfolio

Next, we would like to know your view on the project portfolio in the mission partnership.

Please select the description that best describes your view in relation to:

<p><b>2.a Strategic relevance</b></p>	<p><b>Clear strategic selection</b> I experience that all projects in the mission are closely tied to mission goals and are strategically selected to ensure portfolio coherence.</p>	<p><b>General strategic fit</b> I experience that all projects are relevant to the mission's goals, but I don't see a clear strategic coherence between them.</p>	<p><b>Partial strategic fit</b> I experience some of the projects are relevant to the mission's goals, while for some it's hard to see the connection to the goal.</p>	<p><b>Thematic connection</b> I experience the projects lie within relevant themes, but the connection to the mission's goal is not always clear.</p>	<p><b>Unclear connection</b> The projects have been selected as individually the best but lack a clear connection to the mission's overarching goal.</p>
<p><b>2.b.p Strategic coherence</b> (Only asked those <i>with</i> a project)</p>	<p><b>Strong, identified coherence</b> I experience a strong coherence between my project and other projects in the portfolio, which has been identified and communicated by the mission secretariat or through activities organized by secretariat</p>	<p><b>Established connection</b> The secretariat has established connection between my project and others, either directly or through activities, and I experience some degree of coherence between our projects.</p>	<p><b>Some connection realised</b> My project is connected to at least one other project in the portfolio, which we have discovered more or less by chance.</p>	<p><b>Thematic connection</b> My project fits under the same theme as other projects in the portfolio, but I do not have insight into how our projects fit together.</p>	<p><b>Unclear or no connection</b> I do not experience any connection between my project and other projects in the portfolio.</p>
<p><b>2.c.p Project administration and adjustment</b> (Only asked those <i>with</i> a project)</p>	<p><b>Continuous, strategic adjustment</b> The way my project grant is administered secures continuous strategic adjustments to my project guided by the mission goals and based on learning from my own project, other mission projects, or changes in the ecosystem.</p>	<p><b>Strategic adjustment possible</b> The way my project grant is administered enables strategic adjustments to my project, when project partners experience the need based on learning and results from our project or other insights we have gathered.</p>	<p><b>Occasional adjustments</b> The way my project grant is administered allows for occasional adjustments to the project, but they are not necessarily justified by learning or results from our other projects.</p>	<p><b>Adjustment for practical reasons</b> It is possible to adjust my project for practical reasons or when planned activities are infeasible, but it is not possible to adjust the project according to learnings.</p>	<p><b>No adjustments</b> In the way my project grant is administered, it is not possible to adjust project plans.</p>

### 3. Right partners in the partnership

Now, we would like to know your view on the partners in the partnership.

Please select the description that best describes your view in relation to:

<b>3.a Mission needs</b>	<b>Systemic coverage</b>	<b>Strong coverage</b>	<b>Broad range in place</b>	<b>Partially represented</b>	<b>Key actors missing</b>
	I believe that the partnership includes all necessary actors, sectors and roles to achieve the mission's goals and find that the partnership actively attracts new partners if needed.	I believe all relevant types of actors and sectors are involved, and only few actors of interest are not yet included in the partnership.	I believe the partnership covers important sectors and types of actors, but lacks the balance or range needed to support the mission's full potential.	Several necessary actors are involved, but critical gaps exist – e.g. commercial actors, knowledge institutions, regulators or civil society.	Important sectors and necessary actors are missing in the partnership making it impossible to achieve the mission goal with the current partnership.
<b>3.b.p Project needs</b> (Only asked those <i>with</i> a project)	<b>Strong partner match</b>	<b>Good partner composition</b>	<b>Sufficient but limited collaboration</b>	<b>Partial partner relevance</b>	<b>Lacking key collaboration</b>
	All the partners I need for sparring and collaboration – both for implementation and long-term success – are part of my project or the mission partnership.	Most of the key competencies and collaboration partners are present in my project or in the partnership. A few relevant actors are missing, but I believe I could access them outside the partnership.	My project and the mission partnership include useful partners, but few actors with key perspectives are missing. This could limit our ability to realise the full potential.	Project and mission partners are relevant, but key roles or perspectives are missing entirely – such as commercial actors, public authorities, or researchers – which constrains my project's implementation or impact.	I miss essential partners for implementation of my project. My project is isolated and lacks the connections needed to support the mission goal.

## 4. Productive interactions

Now, we would like to know your view on interaction and collaboration with other mission partners that has been initiated because you are a part of the mission. Do not include interaction that started prior to mission partnership.

Please select the description that best describes your view in relation to:

<b>4.a.n Form of collaboration</b> (Only asked those <i>without</i> a project)	<b>Full co-creation</b> I have entered close co-creation with other actors in the mission where we jointly work towards mission goals.	<b>Integrated collaboration</b> I have entered in collaboration or coordination with other mission partners	<b>Interaction</b> I interact with other mission partners, where we inspire each other.	<b>Consultative role</b> I have been consulted on specific questions or tasks but have not had direct interactions with other mission partners.	<b>No interaction</b> I have not yet had any interaction with other partners in the partnership.
<b>4.a.p Form of collaboration</b> (Only asked those <i>with</i> a project)	<b>Broad mission co-creation</b> I have entered close co-creation both with project partners and other actors in the mission where we jointly work towards mission goals and learn from each other.	<b>Integrated collaboration</b> I am actively engaged with my project partners and make decisions over project direction and also interact with other mission partners, where we inspire each other.	<b>Project collaboration</b> I work closely with my project partners and make decisions over project direction but do not interact with other mission partners.	<b>Consultative engagement</b> I contribute to the project in a clearly defined role. I provide input when asked, but I am not involved in shaping the project or making decisions.	<b>No collaboration</b> I am not involved in collaboration with others in the project as our work is most efficiently carried out in parallel.
<b>4.b Value creation</b>	<b>Transformative value</b> I feel that collaboration has fundamentally changed how I think, act, or approach the problem. I have gained new insights or solutions that would not have been possible without working with others. The collaboration has created value beyond expected.	<b>Significant value</b> I feel that collaboration has clearly improved the quality or outcomes of my project or general work. I have learned from others, and we have achieved more together than we could have individually. The collaboration has generated relevant new knowledge or results.	<b>Functional value</b> I feel that interaction or collaboration has helped solve specific tasks or move my project or general work forward efficiently. While it hasn't led to major new insights, it has added value by enabling smoother progress or coordination	<b>Limited value</b> I feel that interactions have been time-consuming and only marginally useful. I could have achieved similar results working alone. The added value from working with others has been minimal	<b>No value or negative value</b> I have not entered any interaction, or I feel that the interaction has not created real value for my work or the project. It has caused confusion, delays, or frustration. I would have preferred to work independently.

## 5. Ownership and willingness to invest

Now, we would like to know your view on the strategic alignment between your organisation and the mission, and how your organisation invests in the mission.

Please select the description that best describes your view in relation to:

<p><b>5.a Strategic alignment</b></p>	<p><b>Full strategic anchoring</b> We see the mission as a core part of our strategy. Achieving our own goals depends on the mission's success, and we are deeply invested in making it work.</p>	<p><b>Strategic alignment</b> The mission aligns well with our strategic goals, and we are committed. However, we could engage more actively or integrate it more deeply into our priorities.</p>	<p><b>Thematic relevance</b> The mission is relevant to our work, but it is not a strategic priority. Our involvement is meaningful but not central to our organisation's agenda.</p>	<p><b>Formal participation</b> We are involved mainly to access knowledge, networks, or funding. The mission is not especially important to us, but we are curious.</p>	<p><b>Weak strategic link</b> At this point in time, the mission has little or no connection to our strategy. We participate to not miss out on possible opportunities or out of obligation.</p>
<p><b>5.b.n Investment of time and resources</b> (Only asked those <i>without</i> a project)</p>	<p><b>Proactive and broad investment</b> We invest significant time and resources in mission activities. We actively take initiative to support cross-mission collaboration, events, or new activities beyond what is expected.</p>	<p><b>Active engagement</b> We contribute actively to shared mission activities when invited. We occasionally take initiative but mostly respond to existing opportunities.</p>	<p><b>Limited investment</b> We participate in the mission, but it is not a priority in our daily work, and contributions of time and resources are only occasional.</p>	<p><b>Minimal contribution</b> We only engage when required and take no initiative.</p>	<p><b>Passive membership</b> We spend neither time nor resources on mission activities.</p>
<p><b>5.b.p Investment of time and resources</b> (Only asked those <i>with</i> a project)</p>	<p><b>Proactive and broad investment</b> We invest significant time and resources not only in our own project but also in broader mission activities. We actively take initiative to support collaboration across mission partners, events, or new activities beyond what is expected.</p>	<p><b>Active engagement</b> We invest considerable time and resources in our own project and contribute actively to shared mission activities when invited. We occasionally take initiative but mostly respond to existing opportunities.</p>	<p><b>Solid project focus</b> We invest appropriately in our own project and occasionally participate in joint mission activities, but we do not prioritise engagement beyond our project scope.</p>	<p><b>Minimal contribution</b> We deliver on our own project, but with limited time or resources beyond what is strictly required. We rarely engage in broader mission activities and take no initiative outside our project.</p>	<p><b>Passive participation</b> Our investment in the mission is minimal. We allocate just enough resources to meet basic requirements in our project and do not participate in cross-mission activities.</p>

## 6. Applied learning

Now, we would like to know your view on how your project or organization work with learning in the mission partnership.

Please select the description that best describes your view in relation to:

<b>6.a Own learning within the project</b> (Only asked those <i>with</i> a project)	<b>Systematic and adaptive learning</b> We continuously collect and share learning across project partners and actively use it to adjust our goals, methods, and activities. Learning is a shared driver of strategic decisions throughout the project.	<b>Intentional learning</b> We make a conscious effort to gather and apply learning during the project. We occasionally reflect together with other project partners and adjust our work based on shared insights, but this is not fully systematic.	<b>Informal learning</b> We learn through experiences and adjust activities in an informal and unstructured way. Learning may be shared across project partners, but we have no structure or culture that ensures sharing of important learning.	<b>Ad hoc and siloed learning</b> We reflect informally within our own team and may make adjustments, but learning tends to stay within our own organisation rather than being shared with project partners.	<b>No learning practice</b> We do not actively reflect on learning but execute the project as planned. There is no internal or external learning exchange.
<b>6.b Sharing learning with mission partnership</b>	<b>Proactive knowledge sharing</b> We continuously share our learning so others in the mission can use it.	<b>Occasion-driven sharing</b> We take initiative to share our learning with mission partners when there is a clear occasion.	<b>Invited sharing</b> We share learning when it is requested, or if we are invited to do so.	<b>Limited sharing</b> We keep learning internally in the group of project partners or in our organisation.	<b>Nothing to share</b> I do not feel we have anything of interest to share with the mission partnership.
<b>6.c Learn from other mission partners</b>	<b>Systematic learning</b> We systematically and actively obtain learning from other mission partners to adjust our direction in our project or organisation.	<b>Occasional learning</b> We occasionally draw inspiration and learning from others mission projects or partners.	<b>Limited usefulness</b> We are aware of other projects, but they rarely translate into tangible value for our own project or organisation.	<b>No visibility</b> We have no insight into what happens in mission projects, though there may be something of value for us to learn.	<b>Irrelevant learning</b> We cannot learn something of value from other mission projects or partners.

## 7. Transparency and inclusion in decision making

Now, we would like to know your view on transparency and inclusion in decision making.

Please select the description that best describes your view in relation to:

<p><b>7.a: Transparency in funding decisions</b></p>	<p><b>Full transparency and trust</b> I clearly understand how funding decisions are made, including the criteria, process, and rationale. I trust that decisions are fair, consistent, and based on openly communicated priorities.</p>	<p><b>Good transparency with occasional gaps</b> I generally understand how funding is distributed, and most decisions appear fair. Some parts of the process may be unclear or under-communicated.</p>	<p><b>Partial understanding</b> I know who makes funding decisions, but the criteria and reasoning are not always clear. It can be difficult to understand why some projects are supported and others are not.</p>	<p><b>Low transparency</b> I have limited insight into how funding is allocated. Decisions feel top-down, and I don't know what guides the process.</p>	<p><b>Untrusted process</b> I do not understand how or why funding decisions are made. The process feels closed, and I lack trust in its fairness or consistency.</p>
<p><b>7.b: Inclusion in strategic direction of the mission</b></p>	<p><b>Actively shaping the mission's direction</b> I am actively involved in setting and refining the strategic direction of the mission partnership. My input is valued, and I can see how it influences shared priorities, roadmaps, or focus areas.</p>	<p><b>Regularly consulted on direction</b> I am invited to provide input on the mission partnership's strategic direction at key points. While I am not co-steering, my views are taken seriously.</p>	<p><b>Informed and occasionally consulted</b> I am kept informed about changes in direction and sometimes asked for feedback, e.g. at partnership events. However, I am not meaningfully involved in shaping strategic priorities.</p>	<p><b>Minimal inclusion</b> I am rarely consulted about the mission's direction, and decisions are made by the board and secretariat. My role is to implement rather than influence.</p>	<p><b>No inclusion in strategic direction</b> I have no role in shaping the mission's strategic direction. I am unaware of how decisions are made and feel disconnected from the strategic direction.</p>

## 8. Necessary resources and competences

Now, we would like to know your view on the available resources and competences in the mission secretariat.

Please select the description that best describes your view in relation to:

<b>8.a Support from the mission secretariat</b>	<b>Strategic support</b> The secretariat is a strategic learning centre that proactively supports synergy and learning towards mission goals.	<b>Operational support</b> The secretariat is well-functioning and assists with coordination and communication to ensure strategic alignment.	<b>Fragmented support</b> The secretariat handles administration well and keeps us updated on strategic direction but does not play a major strategic role.	<b>Minimal support</b> The secretariat primarily supports administration, not strategic alignment and collaboration.	<b>Absent support</b> I feel the secretariat lacks capacity and structure to administer the mission.
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### **About PLUSS**

At Pluss, we are committed to building a trust-based society — one where trust reduces the need for excessive control and documentation. We help organisations create the right conditions for trust by providing clear direction, enabling effective action, and fostering continuous learning. Our approach is always collaborative: we work closely with clients and partners, often acting as a critical friend — offering both support and constructive challenge. Since 2001, our team of 40 consultants, based in Aarhus and Copenhagen, has been dedicated to delivering trusted advice, practical support, and specialist expertise to a broad range of clients.

